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"AIM, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY" 
01 AIM AND SCOPE : 
The Hague Conference of 1898 was the first serious 
attempt to reduce the burden of armament and world war I 
necessiatiated some form of an agreement to enforce 
disarmament and arms control. The world war II was 
enormously destructive and the situation worsened further 
by the invention of nuclear weapons. The League of Nations, 
the UN and various other committee and commissions have 
devoted a major portion of their effort to reduce and 
eventually eliminate arms. Various treaties like SALT, 
START, outer space treaty. Treaty of Tlatelolco, NPT, 
Sea-Bed treaty etc. have also been signed to this effect. 
At present fifteen countries possesses chemical 
weapons and upto to have the capability to make them. Any 
further increase in number of nuclear weapons states would 
lead to greater instability in the world at large scale. 
The super powers have so far exercised considerable 
restraint time and again, thus trying to make the world 
peaceful and a better place to live in. 
Therefore arms control is the policy of securing 
negotiated limits or reductions on the deployment of weapon 
systems, and. Disarmament refers not only to the giving up 
arms but also to any limitation placed on their development 
or deployment. It covers proposals rangingall the way from 
complete elimination of national armament to a simple 
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freeze on certain types of weapons. 
Therefore there is a need to intensify this effort, 
particularly at this juncture, when all out efforts is 
being made to attain self-sufficiently. However, like all 
emerging research, aorsa^,paper published in these areas are 
scattered and retrieval is difficult. Here an attempt is 
made to collect some important published papers and compile 
bibliography which will be very useful for the researcher 
of our country. 
I was given the task of preparing an annotated 
bibliography of 212 articles on "ARMS CONTROL AND 
DISARMAMENT" as it was thought that it might be of great 
use to research scholars in this field. 
Part one deals with introduction of the topic i.e. 
its historical background and development of different 
types of weapons and their application and effects. Part 
two which is the main part of the present study consists of 
an annotated bibliography of 212 articles on the topic. 
Part three however deals with indices. 
02 METHODOLOGY : 
The material was collected from diffferent journals 
from the Seminar library of Departments of Political 
Science, Centre for Strategic Studies, centre for west 
Asian Studies, Library of coaching and guidance cell, and 
Maulana Azad Library,AMU, Aligarh. 
V 
021 STANDARD FOLLOWED : 
The Indian standard recommendations for biblioyraphical 
references (IS : 2381-1963), Indian Standard recommended for 
abbreviation for titles of periodicals (15 : 18-1949) (in 
some articles and Classified catalogue code) {CCC) of Dr. 
S.R. Ranganathan have been followed. In certain cases v/here 
the said standards become unuseful. I have preferred my own 
judgement. 
022 SUBJECT HEADINGS : 
Attempt has been made to give co-extensive subject 
headings as Imuch possible. An effort has been made to 
follov; postulates and principles given by S.R. Ranganathan 
in the formation of subject headings, and allowed by natural 
language. If more than one entry comes under the same 
subject heading, there are arranged alphabetically by the 
authors' name. 
023 ARRANGEMENT : 
The entries in this bibliography are arranged 
strictly alphabetically among the subject headings. 
The ENTRY ELEMENT of the author(s) is in capitals, 
followed by the secondary element in parenthesis using 
capital and small letters and then the title of the 
article, subtitle (if any), then name of the periodical in 
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abbreviated form (if needed) being underlined followed 
by the volume number, issue" number, the year, giving by 
using inclusive notation of the pages of the articles. 
Then each entry is followed by an indicative abstract of 
the article. 
The items of the bibliographical reference for each 
entry of a periodical artilcesare arranged as follows : 
(a 
(b 
(c 
(d 
(e 
(f 
(g 
(h 
(i 
(J 
(k 
(1 
(m 
(n 
(o 
(P 
(q 
Serial number 
Name of the author/authors 
A full stop (.) 
Title of the article including subtitle and 
alternative title if any. 
A full stop (.) 
Title of the periodical being underlined 
A full stop (.) 
Volume number 
A comma (,) 
Issue number 
Semi colan ( ; ) 
year 
A comma (,) 
Month 
Semi colon(;) 
Inclusive pages of the articles 
A full stop (.) 
VI1 
0231 SAMPLE ENTRY : 
207. KILGOUR (D Marc). Site selection for on site 
inspection in arms control.Arms control.13, 3; 1992, 
Dec; 439-62. 
02311 EXPLANATION : 
This artilce is taken from the periodical "Arms 
Control" which is entitled as "Site selection for on site 
inspection in arms control" written by "D Marc Kil90ur", in 
3rd number of 13th volume of December, 199 2 year, on the 
pages from 439 to 462, against this entry. 
024 ABSTRACT : 
The entries in the bibliography contain abstracts 
giving the essential information about the articles 
documented, I have given indicative abstracts as well as 
informative abstracts. After searching the literature, 
entires were recorded on 7" x 5" cards. 
025 INDICES : 
The part three of the bibliography contain Author, 
and title indexes in the alphabetical sequence. Each index 
guide to the specific entry or entires in the bibliography. 
A list of journals has been given along with their 
place of publication and frequency. Another list consisting 
of the signs and symbols with their full form and meaning 
is also provided. 
* PART ONE * 
* I N T R O D U C T I O N * 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Arms race is not a new phenomenon in international 
relations. It was as well a feature of human society in 
medieval times. However, at the time arms-race v/as not as 
consistent a feature as at present. It was resorted to only 
at the time of acute tension among the nations. As and v/hen 
the tension subsided the arms race also came to a halt. 
Further, at the time the race for armaments \7as 
quantitative and states preferred to acquire more and more 
armaments. But with the advancement of technology the arms 
became more sophisticated. VJith this emphasis, arms race 
shifted from quantity to quality, viz. the states started 
acquiring more and more sophisticated weapons. In fact, 
after the second world war there was a mad race between 
Soviet Union and United States of Ttoerica to outwit each 
other in the acquisition and development of more and more 
sophisticated weapons. 
As a result of arms race in our times the dangers of 
nuclear v/ar have greatly increased. There is a growing 
realisation amongst the world statemen to put a haj^X—to 
this mad race and to evolve some mechanism so that the 
peace of the world is not threatened. This was sought to be 
achieved through disarmament and arms control. 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTItOL 
The term 'disarmament' and 'arms control' are often 
confused and taken as identical. In reality they differ 
from each other, even though they deal with different 
aspects of the same problem. Disarmament does not 
necessarily imply control of arms, as arms control does not 
necessarily mean a reduction in armament levels. Disarma-
ment means a plan or a system for the limitation, reduction 
or abolition of armed forces, including their arms and 
equipment and other related items like military bases and 
budgets. On the other hand arms control means a cooperative 
or multilateral approach to armament policy where armament 
policy includes amount and kinds of weapons, forces, 
development and utilization in periods of relaxation or 
tension. 
ARMS CONTROL : 
Arms control can usefully be divided into two types 
: one is the control over existing weapons systems, 
theother, sometimes called pre-emptive arms control, tries 
to prevent the original deployment of some new or potential 
v/eapon. The most important international successes in arms 
control have been the two Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
treaties between the USA and the USSR, -•- •—. 
signed in 1972 and 1979, which put limits 
on the numbers and types of Strategic nuclear weapons 
either side could deploy. It could also be argued that the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty v/hich formed part of SALT I 
v/as a successful application of pre-emptive arms control. 
In limitiny the number of ABMs which the USA or the USSR 
could build, and setting firm restrictions on the testing 
and development of new methods of Ballistic Missile Defence 
(BMD), it was essentially preventing the emergence of a 
weapons system rather than controlling the deployment of 
one that had already been achieved with any degree of 
reliability. 
The history of arms control negotiations since the 
late 1970s has been complex and chequered.. At the level 
that most people see as the highest priority, which is 
strategic nuclear arms control, there has been no progress 
since SALT II, though both the Reagan and Gorbachev 
administrations appeared eager to make some sort of 
progress in this area. Next in importance to strategic 
nuclear controls, most would place the limitation of 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). When the Soviet Union 
began to modernize its INF forces in the late 1970s with 
the SS-20 intermediate range rockets, NATO responded with 
what was called the Twin-Track policy. This was to begin 
preparations to offset the SS-20 threat bydeploying both 
Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs), and a new 
generation of the existing Pershing missile, and at the 
same time to pursue an arms control agreement with the USSR 
v/hich would either ban or severely limit the numbers of 
either side's modernized Theatre Nuclear Forces. These 
negotiations, held in Vienna, finally collapsed and the USA 
went ahead with GLCM and Pershing deployment in Europe, 
while the Soviet Union increased the numbers of its SS-20 
missiles. However, after a lengthy period of complete 
failure to make any progress towards arms limitation in 
this area, negotiations took on renewed energy and 
flexibility following the Reykjavik Summit of October 1986. 
Further initiatives from Secretary General Gorbachev during 
the firstk half of 1987 raised hopes of an agreement on INF 
reductions being achieved. 
While the greatest media emphasis is placed on these 
nuclear arms control efforts, major effort has also gone 
into attempts at Conventional arms control, in a series of 
negotiating fora over a long period of time. Briefly, there 
are three fora and areas of attempted arms limitations. The 
longest running, in their current form, are the talks in 
Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), 
which have been in progress since 1973 - with virtually no 
success. The main aim here is to withdrav; proportionate 
numbers of Soviet and US troops from the European theatre, 
to be followed by equivalently proportional numbers of 
troops from other Warsaw Pact and NATO members. 
A completely separate approach to increasing inter-
national safety by negotiated agreements in the 
conventional area has been the attempt to agree on what are 
known as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) or sometimes 
Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). This 
means that boththe Warsaw Pact and NATO would inform each 
other of planned troop exercises and war games, possibily 
limit the number of troops engaged in them or observe 
restrictions on where in Europe they could be held, and 
allow observers from the other alliance to monitor the 
exercises. The idea is to remove, as far as is possible, 
the fear of surprise attack under cover of major troop 
movements for training purposes. Some very limited progress 
has been made in notification of such exercise and arms 
control experts in Western Europe and the USA have some 
degree of hope that further progress can be made in this 
area. The main work on confidence building has been 
conducted under the auspices of the Conference on 
Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe (CDE), itself part of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), in Stockholm since 1984. 
The final major area of conventional arms control is 
the attempt to achieve a globally valid and enforceable 
complete ban on the production and stockpiling of Chemical 
Weapons in a Chemical Warfare Convention. Negotiations or 
such a convention have been in process in one form or 
another, since 1967, and the most recent form of 
of negotiations, which have been running since 1982 in the 
Forty Nations Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, were 
thought to be capable of some degree of success towards the 
end of the 1980s. 
These several arms control fora, with their bewil-
dering array of animals, and various and overlapping 
membership, make even the experts confused. However, it is 
generally thought better to have a wide range of bodies 
trying to deal with relatively specialized topics, than to 
risk obscuring possible agreements by combining issues on 
which one or other side might be intransigent with others 
where mutual self-interest may be discovered. What all the 
issues and fora have in common is a central problem, z:.i.z 
Verification. Mutually acceptable limitations can often be 
arrived at by negotiation, only for the two sides to become 
deadlocked because of mutual distrust. 
Typically, the Western countries have demanded that 
they be allowed ways of checking that Warsaw Pact countries 
really are observing the limitations. The USSR has 
traditionally responded by saying that no form of verifi-
cation could be accepted which involved intrusive 
inspections of sites in Warsaw Pact territory. Instead they 
have argued that formal commitments should be enough - that 
nations should trust each other. Furthermore, they argued 
that adequate means existed to carry out remote checks 
without entering another nation's territory. There were 
suggestions in 1987 that the so-called Glasnost (openness) 
atmosphere in the Soviet Union might lead to increased 
willingness to accept verification procedures. If so, this 
would placle the Western countries' position on inspection 
under closer scrutiny. 
External techniques for verification are usually 
referred to as National Technical Means (NTMs) and involve, 
for example, observation by satellites to check on 
deployment of missiles or radar stations, or long-range 
seismographical equipment to monitor underground nuclear 
testing. The problems are obvious : satellites cannot see 
through the roofs of buildings, and seismographs may not be 
able to distinguish categorically between an earthquake and 
a nuclear explosion. It is impossible for those without 
access to classified material to be sure how often the 
West's complaints about the inadequacy of NTMs are real, 
and how often they are just excuses not to ratify an arms 
control agreement which might be against its interest. 
Similarly, one cannot know the extent to which Soviet 
objections to on-site inspections have semmed from a 
legitimate fear of the security risks, and a belief that 
their international status would be impugned, or from a 
calculated intention to cheat. 
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The consequence is that, even on the existing 
agreements like SALT I and SALT II, and the ABM Treaty, 
both sides have periodically accused the other of having 
broken the agreement, butcan only offer evidence that is 
usually lesls than fully convincing. There is little doubt 
that the USA has committed technical breaches of SALT II 
(which has never been ratified by the US Senate, in any 
case) since late 1986. 
The end of 1990 appeared to signal the successful 
completion of the current round of East-West arms control 
negotiations. An agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE) was signed by the NATO and WARSAW pact 
countries on 19 November 19 90, and an agreement on 
confidence and security Building Measures (CSBM) was also 
signed in November. In Dec. the US and the USSR agreed to a 
summit meeting in Moscow the following February in order to 
sign a strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Earlier the 
US senate and the Supreme Soviet had ratified the 
verification protocols for two nuclear testing treaties, 
while a bilateral agreement halting production of chemical 
weapons and reducing US and USSR stockpiles to 5,000 agent 
tons on each side had been signed the previous way. 
However, these were made for reason of defence 
policy or as arms control tactics. Verification remains the 
biggest single restriction on arms control progress, and 
often leads to impressive sounding. 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE : 
Not withstanding the problems which emerged after its 
signing, the CFE Treaty remains an historic agreement that, 
if implemented, will ensure the destruction or permament 
removal from Europe of over 125,000 tanks, artillery, 
armoured vehicles, aricraft and helicopters. The 110 page 
Treaty is by far the most complex and intricate arms 
control agreement ever signed. It is therefore all the more 
remarkable that it took the 22 signatory states just 20 
months to negotiate. 
START 
Negotiations on reducing strategic offensive weapons 
have proceeded at a remarkably slow pace since the basic 
framework was first agreed at the Rejkjavik summit in 
October 1986 and further refined at the Washington summit a 
year later. It took nearly two and a half years to resolve 
residual differences over cruise missiles, mobile 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and the 
relation of offensive force reductions to constraints on 
defensive deployments. Nearly all of these issues had been 
resolved by the time of the Bush-Gorbachev summit in 
May-June 199 0. 
The only two issues which seriously threatened the 
completion of the treaty were the US desire to limit the 
modernization of the SS-18, and Soviet demands that the US 
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halt its strategic co-operation programme with the UK once 
the latter had modernized its sea-based deterrent. Both of 
these issues were resolved during the Houston ministerial 
in December : any further modernization of the SS-18 would 
not involve missiles with more launch weight or thror-
weight than the latest version of the missile, while 
transfer of nuclear systems to third parties was resolved 
through an agreement to disagree, with each side 
interpreting the standard non-circumvention clause in its 
own way. The United States will issue a statement 
indicating that 'existing patterns of co-operation' will 
remain unaffected by START, while the USSR will declare 
that if the strategic balance is altered as a result of 
such co-operation it will consider this to be grounds for 
withdrawing from the Treaty. The UK government, meanwhile, 
has assured Moscow that it has no intention of deploying 
more than four Trident submarines. 
Once these largely political issues were resolved, 
only minor technical disputes remained, which enabled the 
two sides to agree to hold a summit in February 19 91. 
However, shortly after the summit was announced, Moscow's 
principal arms-control advocate, Eduard Shevardnadze, 
resigned as Foreign Minister, in part because of growing 
opposition within the Soviet military to agreements he had 
already reached. The violent crackdown in the Baltics and 
the onset of war in the Gulf distracted the attention of 
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the top political leaders from arms control, leaving the 
latter without clear direction. The Moscow summit was 
consequently postponed and a START agreement is now hoped 
to be ready for signature in late spring 1991 provided the 
differences over the CFE Treaty are resolved. 
In anticipation of its possible conclusion, the main 
provisions of the pending agreement are outlined below : 
Force Limitations 
START will limit deployed ICBM, sea-launched ballis-
tic missiles (SLMB), and heavy bombers to 1,600 on each 
side. These delivery systems can carry on more than a 
combined total of 6,000 accountable nuclear warheads. In 
addition, heavy ICBM are limited to 154 (with no more than 
1,540 warheads), ballistic missile warheads to no more than 
4,900, and warheads on mobile missiles to 1,100. 
Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) are not constrained by 
the Treaty, although a politically binding side agreement 
commits each party to deploy no more than 880 of these 
missiles. A similar side agreement limits deployment of the 
Soviet Backfire bomber to 500 and also commits the USSR not 
to deploy the bomber with a refuelling capability. 
START allows modernization of all strategic systems 
with but a few exceptions. Specifically, it will ban new 
types of heavy ICBM; heavy SLBM and their launchers; mobile 
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launchers for heavy ICBM; new types of UCBM and SLBM with 
more than ten warheads; flight testing and deployment of 
ICBM and SLBM with more warheads than those declared in the 
Washington summit communique of December 1987; ICBM 
launchers with rapid reload capabilities; and the equipping 
of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) with more 
than one warhead. In addition, since START deals with 
strategic nuclear weapons only, there are no limits on 
non-nuclear long-range ALCM if these are distinguishable 
from nuclear ALCM. Nor are heavy bombers which carry only 
conventional armaments, or are used for reconniassance and 
electronic warfare, limited by the Treaty; some 100 heavy 
bombers may in fact be converted to these types of 
aircraft. 
The above force limitations apply only to deployed 
missiles and bombers. Each ballistic missile is attributed 
the number of warheads agreed to in the Washington summit 
communique. 
Bomber counting rules are perhaps START'S most 
remarkable feature. While penetrating (i.e. non-ALCM 
carrying) bombers like the US B-lB and B-2 and Soviet 
Blackjack bombers generally carry 12 to 16 bombs and 
short-range attack missiles, under START their entire 
weapon load will count as just one weapons against the 
6,000 weapon ceiling. 
13 
NEW ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGES : 
The Gulf war clearly demonstrated the need to 
curtail the spiral of armaments - both conventional and 
unconventional - throughout the Middle East. The fact that 
it required the deployment of three quarters of a million 
troops to the region underscores that the spiral is out 
of control. In future crises, it may be neithert possible 
more profitable to resport to the same response. One 
undeniable lesson of the war is that the political health 
of a region depends on prevention rather than cure. Arms 
control is a vital ingredient of such preventive measures. 
Arms control in the post-war era should stress three 
complementary factors. First, there is scope for unilateral 
as well as co-operative measures on the part of suppliers 
to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the 
means for their delivery, as well as to limit the scope of 
the transfer of modern weapons of wr. Second, there is a 
pressing need for regional arms-control measures to control 
the expansion of armaments and move towards their 
reduction in the future. Finally, global measures are 
required to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems, to strengthen 
inspection provisions, and to ban certain particularly 
odious weapons. 
UNILATERAL AND CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES : 
The two most important unilateral measures that all 
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major supplier countries can adopt involve export controls 
and the imposition of mandatory sanctions. The former 
should be geared to preventing the export of many daul-use 
unconventional technologies - nuclear, chemical and 
biological - to unstable regions and potentially aggressive 
powers. Export controls could also be imposed on more 
conventional weapons wi th an eye towards limiting the 
armaments spiral in the Middle East and other regions. 
Mandatory sanctions should apply both to users of weapons 
of mass destruction as well as to companies which supply 
the technology necessary for the development of these 
weapons. 
The utility of these unilateral steps v/ill depend 
foremost on the degree to which supplier states 
co-ordinate their actions. It will be necessary to ensure 
that export controls and sanction guidelines are similar in 
scope. In addition, enforcement of export controls will 
benefit from a sharing of intelligence in dealing wi th 
companies which violate rules. Agreement on the scope and 
application of sanctions is also necessary to enhance their 
deterrent effect. 
Useful efforts at co-ordination have already been 
taken in the area of chemical weapons and missile 
technology. In 1985, a group of Western industrialized 
countries formed the Australia Group to harmonize controls 
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over the export of chemicals that could be used to make 
chemical warfare agents currently, the export of 15 
chemicals is subject to specific government approval, while 
a warning list containing an additional 35 chemicals has 
been circulated to private companies in the hope that they 
would inform governments of any country's interest in 
acquiring them. Although others, including the Soviet 
Union, have adopted legislation controlling the export of 
such chemicals, the effort to limit chemical weapons 
proliferation would be strengthened if potential suppliers 
in Europe as in the developing world were to adhere -
either formally or informally - to the Australia Group 
guidelines. 
A similar effort has guided policy in the area of 
missile technology. In 1987, the countries in the Group of 
Seven (G-7) established the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR), designed to limit the export of technology 
necessary for developing missiles with a range of 300 km 
and over and with a payload larger than 500 kg. Although 
somewhat successful, the MTCR suffers from an 
insufficiently large membership; neither major missile 
exporters such as the USSR, China and North Korea, nor 
aspirant exporting countries like Argentina and Brazil, are 
members, although the USSR has indicated it would 
unilaterally abide by rules comparable to those of the 
MTCR, and China has exercised self-restraint since 1989. A 
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concerted effort to expand the dejure and de facto 
membership of this regime beyond the Western countries 
should be undertaken in an effort to control weapons 
political (if not military) significance was clearly 
demonstrated by the Gulf war. 
Although there were initial efforts during the 1980s 
to control the spread of CW and missile technologies, 
equivalent efforts to constrain the transfer of more 
conventional armaments were not made previous efforts to 
limit arms transfers, including the conventional arms 
transfer talks in the late 1970s, failed because of 
political differences among the participants and a more 
general lack of urgency. The end of the Cold War removes a 
major reason for using arms sales to achieve political 
ends, while the possibility of being forced to take action 
against a well-armed adversary should strengthen interest 
in limiting the transfer of armaments to politically 
volatile regions. Another attempt to constrain conventional 
arms transfers in a co-ordinated UN Security Council bear a 
special responsibility in this regard since they account 
for some 85% of conventional arms transfers. 
Whatever the unilateral and co-operative measures 
adopted, the most difficult, but nevertheless the most 
important step, must be consistency in applying measures to 
allies and potential adversaries alike. This is important 
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not only to enhance the credibility of these measures, but 
it is also in the long-term self-interest of the countries 
adopting these measures. As the disaster with Iraq has 
shown, erstwhile allies can become dangerous opponents. How 
difficult it is to apply this stark lession is shown by one 
of the first steps undertaken by the Bush administration in 
response to the Iraqi invasion; the announcement of major 
new arms sales to countries in the region. 
REGIONAL MEASURES : 
The effectiveness of unilateral and co-operated 
measures will depend to a large extent upon the degree to 
which they are supplemented by regional and global 
measures. The objectives of the former should be : to 
reduce the level of armaments currently present in the 
Middle East; and to remove towards the elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction, while sharply curtailing their 
means of delivery. Achieving the second might prove easier 
than the first. Although limiting the inventory of 
conventional weapons possessed by key countries in the 
Middle East is highly desirable, movement towards this goal 
will depend first on setting the political differences that 
exist among these states. Only once the perceived threat to 
security had clearly diminished will these countries reduce 
their present reliance on large quantities of lethal 
weaponry. This is particularly true in the Middle East 
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since the manifold variety of perceived security threats 
for each country makes it currently impossible to define an 
adequate level of armaments. For example, a purchase by 
Saudi Arabia might be perceived as destabilizing by Israel, 
but indispensable to cope with Iraq (or Iran). 
While progress towards a political settlement will 
also help in the search to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction, it is possible that this might be achieved at 
an earlier date. A taditional obstacle to eliminating one 
category of weapons of mass destruction, it is possible 
that this might be achieved at an earlier date. A 
traditional obstacle to eliminating one category of weapons 
in the region (such as chemical weapons) has been the 
insistence on the part of some Arab countries that their 
right to possess CW should not be abridged so long as 
Israel was a nuclear power. More recently, however, there 
have been signs that every country in the region recognizes 
that its security might be enhanced if steps were taken 
towards the elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons from the region, Israel is already on record in 
support of moves towards nuclear and chemical weapons free 
zones in the Middle East, while Egypt has proposed that the 
region become a zone of free of all weapons of mass 
destruction. In addressing the security requirements of the 
region in the months ahead, it would be useful to explore 
these proposals in greater detail. 
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GLOBAL MEASURES : 
While events in the Gulf have highlighted the 
problems in the Middle East, political volatility is not 
limited to that region. Success in arms control will 
therefore ultimately depend on global measures. In the 
first instance, these should focus on nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and missiles. 
The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) has proved remarkably successful in stemming 
the spread of nuclear weapons. However, the Treaty comes up 
for renewal in 1995, and complaints on the part of many 
non-nuclear weapons states regarding the lack of progress 
in strategic arms control generally, and the cessation of 
nuclear testing in particular, poses a threat to the 
regime. Therefore, priority should be given to steps 
ensuring the renewal of the Treaty. 
Any regional effort to eiminate CW would be more 
likely to succeed if it were supplemented by global 
measures. It is clear that with a concerted political 
effort on the part of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, a convention banning the production, possession and 
transfer of chemical weapons could be signed in 1992. At 
present, the conclusion of this convention is blocked inter 
alia by the US position on two inter-related issues. The 
first concerns the retention of a security stockpile of 
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chemical weapons until all other 'CW-capable' states have 
joined, while the second relates to retaining the right to 
retaliate in kind in the initial years of the convention. 
The Bush administration's reluctance to allow challenge 
inspections without right of refusal (though originally 
contained in the US-proposed draft treaty) is also a major 
obstacle. 
The Gulf war has provided perhaps the clearest 
evidence to date that the possession of chemical weapons by 
even a heavily armed and clearly aggressive country does 
not deter military intervention on the part of major 
powers. If further underscores the fact that there is no 
military or strategic basis to the Bush administration's 
contention that the use of CW is deterred only by the 
threat of retaliation in kind. As to the US position on 
challenge inspections, the war again demonstrates that the 
benefits of an unlimited right to inspect suspect sites in 
other countries outweigh the slight risk of allowing 
international inspectors in or near other sensitive 
facilities. In short, there is little reason to hold up 
completion of a CW convention. 
Although biological weapons (BW) are prohibited by 
the Biological Weapons Convention which was signed in 197 2 
and came into force in March 1975, there are no provision 
for verifying the ban. The Convention came up for review in 
March 1980 after an explosion occurred at a military 
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compound in Sverdlovsk, in the USSR. The explosion 
allegedly released a strain of bacteria into the 
atmosphere, but no verification was ever possible. In 
September 1986 a second review conference in Geneva 
improved some of the articles of the original Convention 
but failed to deal with the question of verification. The 
threat that continues to exist is shown by the fact that 
Iraq, a signatory of this Convention, is considered by the 
United States to possess BW. A strong case can be made that 
the negotiation of verification rules for the 1972 
Convention is long overdue. 
Finally, the Gulf War has shown that, the 
inaccuracy of the Scud and the success of the Patriot not-
withstanding, there is a need to address the growing 
proliferation of ballistic missiles. With the planned 
elimination of US and Soviet ground-based missiles from 
Europe, it is time to think about a treaty which would 
expand this ban worldwide. Specifically, the multilateral 
treaty banning all ground-launched missiles with ranges 
between 100 and 5,000 km could be modelled on the 1987 
Washington treaty which banned ground-based cruise and 
ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,000 km. 
The fact that the US and the USSR have opted to forgo 
deployment of these missiles should provide an incentive 
for other countries to follow suit. Moreover, in order not 
to inhibit the legitimate interest of some countries in 
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seeking access to space, a new international agency might 
be set up which would commit the major powers to provide 
the requisite technology and allow those countries without 
a space-launch capability access to the facilities at cost. 
There is no paucity of other ideas for unilateral, 
co-operative, regional or global arms-control measures. 
This only emphasizes the fact that the end of Cold War 
merely signals the completion of the traditional East-West 
arms control agenda, not of arms control as such. Indeed, 
with the end of the Cold War the need to meet new 
arms-control challenges has been exposed by the Gulf War. 
In each case, effective US-Soviet co-operation will provide 
the lynchpin to securing agreement on far-reaching 
arms-control measures. With such co-operation, arms control 
might have a chance; without it, failure will be certain. 
START - ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS : 
George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev affixed their 
signatures on the Strategic Arms Relation Talks (START) 
treaty at the Moscow Summit on July 31. START for the first 
time imposes formal constraints on strategic offensive 
weapons. The signing of the treaty at a summit meeting had 
only ceremonial significance as the two sides had ironed 
out all their differences and the draft was ready for 
signature. 
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It took nearly nine years and sea changes in the 
security perspectives of the two countries, resulting from 
momentuous changes that took place in Europe and the Soviet 
Union itself, to bring the START negotiations to fruition. 
The US put forward two-phase plan for reduction of 
strategic arms. In phase one the Soviet Union was required 
to cut its mssiles numbering 2350 to 850. The number of 
warheads was to limited to 5000 each. Of these only 50 per 
cent could be mounted on land based missiles. The number of 
heavy bombers was to remain at the same level of 400 for 
the US and 350 for the Soviet Union. The Cruise missiles 
were to be discussed but not limited until phase two. The 
soviet Union was required to reduce its SS-18 missiles. 
In phase two the Soviet Union was to give up its 3 
to 1 advantage in ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union did 
not put any counter-proposal. 
Experts predict that this may turn out to be the 
last comprehensive treaty. In future, agreements would be 
more modest and on more specific issues. Budget constraints 
probably would be more effective force in limiting nuclear 
arms. 
Despite its limitations START is being held as 
"historic". France welcomed the signing of the treaty but 
did not give any indication it was going to trim its own 
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arsenal. While welcoming the treaty Britain and China 
remained silent on this vital question. China did not fail 
to point out that the US would still have 9,000 nuclear 
warheads and the Soviet Union 7,000, enough to destroy the 
other several times over. Watever position these countries 
may take the pressure of world opinion would be on them to 
cut their own arsenals. 
START'S significance is more in political rather 
than in the area of reduction of strategic nuclear 
missiles. As a result of the agreement on strategic weapons 
the United States and the Soviet Union have moved one sktep 
closer to each other. 
"We can now take steps to make the world a less 
dangerous place than ever before in the nuclear age", Mr. 
Bush said in a prime time television address from the oval 
office of the White House. 
The President undertook several steps unilaterally, 
without waiting for a complementary Soviet commitment. He 
grounded all US strategic bombers and took them off the 
alert status after more than 30 years. 
He also removed from alert status al missiles 
covered by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). 
Concluding his speech, Mr. Bush said ; "destiny is 
not a matter of chance, it is a mater of choice, it is not 
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a thing to be waited for, it is a thing to be achieved. The 
United States has always stood where duty required us to 
stand. Now let them say that we led where destiny required 
us to lead - to a more peaceful, hopeful future. We cannot 
give a more precious gift to the children of the world". 
DISARMAMENT 
Disarmament has been a goal of peace movement and 
individual peace leaders, as well as out- and out pacifist, 
since the mid 19th century or even earlier. 
The history of disarmament can be traced back on 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The treaty stipulated 
that all existing fortifications be demolished and no new 
fortifications be erected. However, the first systematic 
proposal for the reduction of armaments was mooted by Czar 
of Russia in 1816 when he proposed to the British 
Government the reduction of all types of armed forces. 
However, these proposals were not seriously received and 
failed to produce any impact. In the year 1863 and 1869 
France also submitted certain proposals for the reduction 
of armaments to the Great Power but they also met the fate 
of the proposals submitted by the Russian Czar. Other 
powers like Britain (1870) and Italy (1877) also initiated 
steps to put a stop to armament race but without any 
success. 
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The most systematic effort to reduce the armament 
was made by Tsar Russia in 1898 when he addressed a note to 
the various powers of Europe to meet at Hague and work out 
a scheme for reduction of arms. These proposals received 
warm response and resulted in the First Hague Peace 
Conference. This Conference was attended by 28 states. The 
next conference held in 1907 also initiated proposals for 
the reduction of arms and expenditure on military forces, 
but this also did not find favour with the powers. Thus 
both the Hague Conferences failed to solve the problems of 
arms race. 
DISARMAMENT AFTER FIRST WORLD WAR : 
The devastation caused by the First World War 
greatly stirred the conscience of mankind and the statemen 
of the world started giving serious thought to the need of 
abolition of arms and ammunition. The Treaty of Versailles, 
which established peace after World War I, specifically 
provided that the maintenance of peace requires the 
reduction of national armaments to the lowest point 
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by 
common action of international obligation", the seriousness 
of the world statemen to regulate arms is evident from the 
fact that they charged the League of Nations with the duty 
of securing an agreement on the general disarmament. To 
facilitate the task of the League it was provided in the 
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Covenant that the membership of the League shall be 
available only to those countries who were willing to 
accept arms regulations proposed by the League. 
PREPARATORY COMMISSION AND GENEVA CONFERENCE : 
In 1925 the League set up the Preparatory Commi-
ssion and entrusted it with the responsibility of preparing 
a provisional draft treaty concerning various questions of 
disarmament. 
EFFORTS OUTSIDE THE LEAGUE : 
Outside the league also efforts to control the arms 
and secure disarmament were made. In 1921-22 at the 
Washington Conference the five major powers (Britain, USA, 
France, Japan and Italy) agreed to fix their respective 
naval strength. They made an effort to come to some under-
standing regarding cruisers, submarines, destroyers and 
aircrafts but could not succeed. As the treaty remained 
unratified the understanding automatically lapsed. 
The efforts at diarmament in the inter-war period 
both through the League of the Nations and outside failed 
to achieve anything substantial. In fact almost all the 
states were interested in strengthening their respective 
positions rather than reducing the weapons. 
DISARMAMENT AFTER WORLD WAR II : 
The enormous destruction caused by the Second World 
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War roused the conscience of the world statemen. Fearing 
that another war may completely wipe out the human race 
they started making more frantic efforts to regulate the 
armament. The UN Charter also laid great emphasis on the 
regulation of agreements. At least three of its articles 
were devoted to this problem. 
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION : 
Soon after the adoption of the UN Charter the Atom 
Bomb was exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. The 
untold suffering caused by the bombarment of these two 
towns of Japan led to a wide-spread demand for devising a 
system of control to prevent the use of atomic energy for 
destructive purposes, and use of humanitatian and peaceful 
purposes. Accordingly, on 26 January 1946 the General 
Assembly decided to set up an Atomic Energy Commission 
consisting of all the permanent members of Security Council 
and Canada. 
COMMISSION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS : 
In pursuance of the General Assembly resolution of 
December 1946, the Security Council set up a Commission on 
Conventional Armaments in February 1947. The Commission was 
expected to prepare and submit to the Council within three 
months proposals for "the general regulation and reduction 
of armaments and armed forces". The Commission held its 
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first meeting on 24 March 1947 and finally adopted a 
resolution on 12 August 1948. 
DISARMAMENT COMMISSION : 
The failure of these two Commission did not deter 
the world leaders and they continue their efforts to 
regulate the armaments. On the suggestion of the American 
President Truman that the two Disarmament Commissions 
should be merged, the General Assembly set up a Committee 
of Twelve members (11 members on Security Council and 
Canada) to report the ways and means whereby the work of 
the two commissions could be combined. The Committee 
recommended the merger of the two Commissions. Its 
recommendations were accepted by the General Assembly and a 
Disarmament Commission was created on 11 January 1952. The 
Commission took up a number of issues concerning arms and 
their reduction but failed to make much headway because of 
the divergence of views amongst the Super Powers. 
ATOMS FOR PEACE PLAN (1953) : 
In 195 3 President Eisenhower of USA came out with a 
new plan for peaceful use of atoms. This plan popularly 
known as Atoms for Peace Plan apealed to all those powers 
who possessed atomic energy material to contribute the same 
to the Atomic Energy Commission under the United Nations. 
This plan was also turned down by Soviet Union who insisted 
on prior agreement on prohibition of atomic weapons. 
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SOVIET PROPOSAL OF MAY 1955 
In May 1955 Soviet Union suddenly submitted new 
proposal which was quite identical to the Anglo-French 
Memorandum in so far as it accepted the same force levels. 
However, this proposal was quite distasteful to USA because 
it insisted on dismantling of all United States overseas 
bases and a ban on nuclear tests. 
THE GENEVA SUMMIT AND OPEN SKIES PLAN : 
In July 195 5 the chiefs of state from France, UK, 
USA and USSR met at Geneva to discuss among others the 
problem of disarmament. At this meeting USA proposed the 
'open skies' plan. Under the plan both USA and USSR were to 
exchange military information which could be verified by 
mutual aerial reconissance. However, Russia did not feel 
convinced as to how inspection of the coQcealed nuclear 
weapons shall be possible. She also insisted that all 
actions in this regard should be subject to Security 
Council's decisions and hence veto of the Permament Members 
of the Security Council. As these conditions were not 
acceptable to USA the plan fell. 
NUCLEAR TEST BAN : 
Encouraged by the announcement of Soviet Union in 
March 1958 regarding a unilateral ban on tests of atom and 
hydrogen bombas, three nuclear powers, USA, USSR, and B 
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Britain held a Conference at Geneva from October 1958 to 
April 1961. After long deliberations the three powers 
agreed to suspend forthwith all tests in the earth's 
atmosphere, in outer space, in ocean and underground. This 
was to be ensured through a world-wide detective system to 
be operated by a single neutral administrator and an 
international staff. However, Soviet Union, in violation of 
this agreement went ahead with the explosion of Megaton 
Bomb. This provoked USA to declare that she would also go 
ahead with similar explosion. As a result the progress made 
in the direction of securing nuclear test ban at the Geneva 
Conference was watered down. 
TEN NATIONS DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (1960) : 
In 1960 ten nations, five from each block (USA, UK, 
Canada, France and Italy from Western block and Soviet 
Union, Romania, Yogoslavia, Poland and Bulgaria from the 
communist bloc) met at Geneva and made another serious bid 
to secure disarmament. As a result of prolonged 
deliberations the differences between the rival camps were 
considerably narrowed down. Soviet Union proposed a four 
year plan of complete disarmament spread over three phases. 
The Western nations did not respond favourably to the 
Soviet Plan and came forward with their own plan on March 
1960. This Plan was not acceptable to the Soviet Union and 
her allies. As a result a stalemate was reached and finally 
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the Soviet Union and her allies walked out of the 
Conference. With this the Conference came to an abrupt end. 
EIGHTEEN NATIONS DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (1962) : 
In 1962 another conference was held at Geneva which 
is popularly known as Eighteen Nations Disarmament 
Conference. At this Conference also separate plans were 
submitted by USA and Soviet Union. This Conference was 
significant because the Neutral Nations also came forward 
with their own plan. They suggested the establishment of an 
International Commission of Scientists to process the data 
received from the observation posts and to report on all 
nuclear explosions. The Eighteen Nations Conference also 
could not accomplish anything and faltered over the issue 
of verification. 
LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY (1963) : 
In June 1963 President Kennedy emphasised the need 
for a nuclear test ban treaty. The proposal received 
favourable response from Soviet Union and culminated in the 
Test Ban Treaty of 1963. This treaty concluded at Moscow on 
5 August 196 3, "prohibited the states from carrying out any 
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear 
explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or 
control". Though initially the treaty was concluded by the 
three Nuclear Powers, USA, USSR and UK, it was made open to 
all the states. In fact, both China and France (the other 
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nuclear powers) refused to sign the treaty because iot did 
not insist on the destruction of nuclear stock-piles of USA 
and USSR. 
OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 1967 : 
This treaty laid down the pricriiples governing 
peaceful activities of the state in outer space and 
prohibited nuclear weapons and their landing on the moon 
and other celestial bodies for military bases. The treaty 
was formally signed on 27 January 1967 and came into force 
on 10 October 1967. Under the treaty the signatory states 
agreed not to place in orbit around the earth any 
objectives carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
CONFERENCE OF NON-NULCER WEAPON STATES (1968) : 
In August-September 1968 a Conference of the 
Non-nuclear Weapons States was held at Geneva at the 
initiative of the General Assembly. This Conference ws 
attended by 96 states including the four nuclear powers -
USA, USSR,France and UK. 
With regard to the establishment of the 
nuclear-weapon free zones, the Conference recommended that 
the non-nuclear weapons states should examine the 
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possibility and desirability of establishing military 
denuclearization of their respective zones. 
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 1968 : 
The Treaty on Non-proliferationof Nuclear Weapons 
was simultaneously signed at London. Moscow and Washington 
on 1 July 1968 and actually came into force on 5 March 
1970.The treaty, based on the draft submitted by the 
Seventeen Nations Disarmament Committee, prohibited the 
transfer by nuclear weapon states to any recipient 
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices or of control over them. The signatory states were 
not to encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weaons or other 
explosive devices of control over such weapons or 
explosive devices. 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 1972 : 
An effort to check the use of bacteriological and 
chemical weapons was made in 1972 by signing the 
"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stock piling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their destruction". The 
Convention signed on 10 April 1972 at London, Moscow and 
Washington actually came into force on 16 March 1975. The 
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signatory states agreed not to develop, produce, stockpile 
or otherwise acquire or retain micro-bial or other 
biological agents or toxin weapons, equipment of means of 
delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostiole 
purpose or in armed conflict. They were to either destroy 
or divert to peaceful purpose within nine months of the 
enforcement of convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery. 
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AND SALT 1972 : 
Simultaneous attention ws also paid to the 
limitation of the strategic arms with a view to achieve 
disarmament. The two super Powers - USA and USSR held 
prolonged negotiations at Geneva and finally agreed to meet 
at Helsinki. The negotiations continued for nearly four 
years before the conclusion of the strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty of 1972. In fact, the agreement broadly 
consisted of two separate treaties viz. Treaty on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System and the Interim 
Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the 
Limitation of the Strategic Offensive Arms. While the 
former was concluded for an unlimited period, the latter 
was of five year duration. 
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty permitted 
the two super powers to have only two sites for ballistic 
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missile defences, one for the protection of their national 
capital area and the other for the protection of the field 
of ICBMs. The treaty also laid down details regarding the 
dimensions of the ABM system the two countries were to 
have. 
The Interim Agreement with regard to the Limitation 
of the Strategic Offensive Arms was a very complex 
agreement. It covered both land-based ICBMs and sub-marine 
launched ballistic missiles. The two powers were permitted 
to undertake modernisation and replace their strategic 
offensive Arms, but they had to scrupulously follow the 
numerical limits prescribed by the treaty. An argreement 
regarding the procedure of agreement was also reached 
between the two powers. 
US-SOVIET ARMS PACT 1974 : 
Further progress in the direction of disarmament 
was made in July 1974 when USA and Soviet Union signed a 
10 uear pact, stipulating not only the limitation of the 
offensive nuclear weapons but also the stoppage of all 
underground tests of more than 150 milotons. 
SALT II (1979) : 
SALT I signed by USA and USSR lapsed in October 
1977. Both the powers continued to observe its provisions 
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and continued efforts for a new agreement. After prolonged 
negotiations they signed at Vienna on 1 June 1979 the SALT 
II treaty to limit the strategic offensive weapons for a 
period upto 31 December 1985. While concluding this treaty 
both the powers reaffirmed their desire to take further 
measures for further limitation and reduction of strategic 
arms with a view to achieve general and complete 
disarmament. As this argreement was in the nature of a 
treaty, it was sent to the US Senate for ratification, as 
required under the constitution. But before the Senate 
could ratify the same the cordial atmosphere ws disturbed 
by the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan which jeopardised 
the ratification of SALT II. 
During the year 1980 only limited contact took 
place between USA and Soviet Union on the question of arms 
control The US Government motivated by the events in 
Afghanistan proceeded to review and to expand its armament 
programe. Despite this Soviet Unin repeatedly expressed its 
willingness to negotiate. On 18 February 1980, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko indicated the readiness of 
Soviet Unin to carry on disarmament talks with the West, 
particularly on the reduction of nuclear arms in Europe if 
NATO's decision of December 1979 regarding modernisation 
(which involved employment of Perishing lis and Cruise 
missiles) was cancelled or not implemented. As a result 
Preparatory US-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitation 
were held in Geneva from 16 October to November 1980 which 
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in greater understanding of each otherSs position 
and they agreed to resume negotiations in 1981. 
SOVIET PROPOSALS REGARDING PROHIBITION OF STATIONING OF 
WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE : 
In 1981, Soviet Union proposed a treaty of 
unlimited duration to prohibit the stationing of weapons of 
any kind in outer space, including stationing of 'reusable' 
manned space vehicle. The parties to the treaty were to 
undertake not to destory, damage or disturb the normal 
functioning or change the flight trajectory of space 
objects of other states, if such objects were placed in the 
orbit in 'strict accorcance' with the above mentioned 
provisions. 
In December 1981 the UN General Assembly taking 
into account the proposals of the Soviet Union, required 
the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with 
a view to achieving agreement on the text of an appropriate 
treaty to prevent the spread of arms race to outer space. 
However, much progress could not be made due to the 
difficulties in reaching further arms control agreements 
relating to outer space because most of the satellites are 
used for military purpose. Further, the competition going 
on between the two supers in bound to generate pressure for 
preemptive action and thus decrease rather than increase 
the sense of security of the powers in question, bringing 
39 
no advantage to either side. 
EFFECTS BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY : 
During the year 1981, the UN General Assembly also 
initiated a number of measures to check nulcear weapons, 
chemical weapons as well as to promote the disarmament. The 
Assembly expressed concern over continued nulcear weapon 
tests and urged UK, USA and USSR to resume their trilateral 
negotiations (which were interrupted in 1980) on a 
comprehensive test ban treaty and to bring them to an 
early conclusion. It also suggested the conclusion of an 
international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons 
in general and declared that the use of such weapons would 
be a violation of the UN cChater and a crime against 
humanity. Similarly, the General Assembly while calling for 
continuation of negotiations on convention prohibiting 
chemical weapons called on all the states to refrain from 
any cation which could impede such negotiations and to 
specifically refrain from the production and development of 
binary and other new types of chemical weapons. It also 
requested that chemical weapons should not be stationed in 
those states where there are no such weapons at present. 
With a view to promote disarmament, the General 
Assembly recommended that a world disarmament campaign 
should be launched and a conference be held at the United 
Nations to finance the campaign. It expressed the view 
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that a world wide collection of signatures in support of 
measures to prevent thenuclear war and arms race be 
started, which would help in creating favourable climate 
for achieving progress in the field of disarmament. 
However, despite its active interest to effect arms 
control, the General Assembly could not attain much success 
due to an atmosphere of increased international tension. 
REAGAN PLAN OF 18 NOVEMBER 1981 : 
On 18 November 1981 President Reagan of United States 
proposed a four point agenda suggesting (1) that the United 
States was prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II 
and ground launched cruise missiles if the Soviet Union 
would dismantle its SS-20, SL-4, and SS-5 medium and 
intermediate range ballistic missiles; (2) that USA would 
seek to negotiate substantial reduction in nuclear arms 
which would result in equal and verifiable levels and that 
to symbolize this the negotiations would be called START 
(Strategic Arms Reduction Talks); (3) That action should be 
taken to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional 
forces in Europe; and (4) That USA urged the USSR to join 
with it and many other natins to establish a western 
proposed conference on disarmament in Europe. 
However, these proposals were outrightly rejected 
by the Soviet Union. The Soviet President Brezhnev said 
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that if the United Sttes were prepared toagree to complete 
reduction of all kinds of nuclear weapons in the East and 
West, Soviet Union would be in favour. 
INF TT^KS AT GENEVA NOVEMBER (1981) : 
On 30 November 1981 talks between USA and Soviet 
Union on intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) commenced 
at Geneva. The deliberations were held in camera. But much 
progress could not be made. On 3 February 1982 Brexhnev 
prposed that both the sides should reduce their medium 
range nuclear weapons by two-thirds by 1990, but the 
proposal was rejected by President Reagan. On 9 February, 
1982 Soviet Union proposed a modified plan but this was 
also turned down by USA the next day. 
USA reacted sharply and stated that it would not 
tolerate any stationing of nuclear missiles i n Cuba. On 31 
March 1982 President Reagan said "I want an agreement on 
strategic nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of war, 
lowers the level of armament and enhances global security. 
We can accept no less." 
START NEGOTIATIONS : 
On May 9, 1982, US President suggested that formal 
START negotiations be held between the two countries at 
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Geneva in June 1982. He proposed two stages. During the 
first stage the number of the ballistic missile war-heads 
was to be reduced by at least one-third below current 
levels. During the second stage they were to achieve equal 
ceilings of ballistic missiles. The Ian also insisted on 
effective verification procedures. But the plan was 
dismissed by Soviet Union "as a hopeless attempt to ensure 
US superiority. However, the plan said nothing about the 
programme to deploy MX missiles, strategic B-1 bombers and 
Trident nuclear missile submarines. 
On 18 May, 1982 President Brezhnev made an offer of 
freeze on nuclear missiles and proposed freeze on the 
modernization and deployment of stratgic weapons. He said 
that to begin the START talks on right note, three things 
should be done.{l) The talks should pursue the aim of 
limiting arms and reducing strategic arms rather than being 
a cover for the continued arms race and the break-down of 
the existing party. (2) Both sides should pay due regard 
to each other's legitimate security interests and 
acknowledge the principle of equality and equal security. 
(3) The positive achievements of earlier talks should not 
be overlooked. The proposals of Brezhnev were immediately 
rejected by USA. 
The START talks opened in Geneva on 29 June 1982 in 
which the delegations of USA and USSR took part. Though the 
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talks were secret, the two delegations made 
certainstatements regarding their respective positions, 
which virtually relfected the view they had already 
expressed. At these talks USSR offered to make substantial 
cuts in the long-range missile and bomber forces in return 
for US agreement to forego the deployment of new 
medium-range missiles in Europe and to accept stringent 
restrictions on all further cruise missile deployments. 
Thus Soviet Union tried to link INF and STAI^ T talks. 
SPECIAL DISARMAMENT SESSION OF GENRAL ASSEMBLY (JUNE 1982): 
In June 1982, the General Assembly helda special 
session on disarmament in implementation of the resolution 
passed by the General Assembly in December 1978. 
The Assembly proceeded on the basis of a draft on 
comprehensive programme of disarmament drawn up by the 
working group of the UN Committee on Disarmament. The draft 
programme dealt with the disarmament problem under various 
headings viz. nuclear weapons; other weapons of 
destruction; conventional weapons and armed forces; 
military expenditure; measures for provention of arms race 
o the seabed, on the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof 
and in outer space; and establishment of zone of peace. At 
this session the Soviet Union announced that it would not 
be the first to use nuclear weapons. It may be noted that 
even before Soviet Union made this announcement. China had 
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made similar announcement in the Assembly in earlier 
months. Tn the special session again the Chinese leaders 
called upon the nuclear powers to undertake unconditionally 
not to use nuclear weapons against nn-nucler states and in 
nuclear weapon free zones and also not to be the first to 
use such weapons agaist one another "at any time and under 
any circumstances". TheAmerican President, Reagan, however, 
told the General Assembly that USA remained committed to 
peace and would do all could do toreach arms control accord 
with Moscow, but the past record of Soviet Union in Eastern 
Europe, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan and Poland 
raised doubts the sincerity of Soviet intentions. 
Thus there were wide differences between the East 
and the West and the nuclear and the non-nuclear nations. 
PROPOSALS REGARDING FREEZING OF NUCLEAR ARSENELS (NOVEMBER 
1982) : 
On 22 November 1982, Andropov, Secretary General of the 
Soviet Communist Party reiterated the proposal for freeze 
on the nuclear arsenals of both countries as 'a first step 
towards agreement'. However, the proposals did not receive 
favourable US response. ON the other hand President Reagan 
of USA emphasised the need to replace and modernize the US 
forces and also to proceed with the production and 
development of MX. This evoked strong reaction from Soviet 
leaders and they asserted that the MX programme was 
conterary to SALT-I and SALT-II treaties and would create 
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new obtacles to START negotiations. 
NEW US PROPOSALS ON START : 
In 1983 USA proposed 'build down' whereby each side 
while modernizing its forces would effect 5 percent 
reduction of its forces each year until 19S)2. According to 
this plan each new unit of ICBM fire power developed was 
to be matched by reduction of two old units of ICBM fire 
power and each new unit of submarine launched fire power 
was to be matched by dismantling the two old units. The 
proposal also envisaged the establishment of a Commission 
to work out the details of a build down. 
The Soviet Union responded to US proposals and 
called for reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
from about 2400 to 1800 or 1950, while demanding that the 
US must not deploy any new intermediate range missiles in 
Europe whatsoever. Soviet Union also demanded that the 
British and the French forces be counted in INF process. 
However, the British and French were determined to maintain 
independent deterrents which were not subject to US-USSR 
negotiations. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
Disarmament is a problem having global orientation. 
It is not a problem of a particular country but the problem 
of the entire community of nation whether proliferator or 
non-proliferator. The resolution of this problem of 
disarmament is not an easy task. The international community 
has made various efforts to tackle the problem, but end 
result in this regard is not satisfactory. The development 
and procurement of weapons continues its pace has been 
slowing down after the dismemberment of USSR and the end of 
the cold war. In other words overall global domains for 
armament have reduced either due to the end of the cold war 
or the economic crunch. 
The United States of America and Russia both 
continue to be impressive military powers in international 
relations. The Russian development of weapons is as hold due 
to the economic crunch. Hov;ever the united States of America 
which in the wake of cold war, sought from the other arms 
supplying countries, to show restraint in the name of the 
global security, has itself become the world's biggest arm 
merchant. American sale accounted for 57% of the 24 Billion 
Dollars weapons which the developing countries ordered in 
1992. In 1987 when the total developing v/orld arms purchases 
were twice of what they are today. The US share was less 
than 13%. The total US weapons sales last year i.e. 1993
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about 34 Billion dollars. The problems of disarmament is 
infact not being taken care of specially by powers like 
USA. The US arms sales are infact creating competitive 
vigor within Russia and Europe. 
The developing countries in last few years have 
diverted their efforts to procure arms indigenously 
thereby reducing their dependency on the arms supplying 
countries. Moreover they also continue to procure arms 
through arms transfer deals and arms purchase. This 
phenomenon is quite visible in South Asia, where both 
India and pakistan are procuring arms by both means. 
The situation in South Asia is that India and 
Pakistan have been involved in perpetual conflict since 
partition in 1948. So far the disarmament attempts in this 
region have no v/here reached and agreement - the chances 
for the disarmament seems to be very bleak with India 
advocating general disarmament covering all weapons and 
systems as well as all the countries of the world and, 
with Pakistan accepting the restraint on its arms & 
armament only when India takes the precedance. The world 
has v;itnessed the drastic changes in international 
relations in last few years but the very basic nature of 
international politics continues to be anarchic,^ and in 
the absence of international authority to resolve the con-
flicting interest of nations' international relations, the ultimate 
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instruments which nations can employ for the resolution* 
of their dispute is the use of force, and force is acquired 
primarily ' from the military strength of a nation 
and,the military strength is dependent on the procurement 
of arms and the development of new weapons systems'SO»the 
arm race is not going to completely die down. 
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ARMS CONTROL 
1. STEINBRUNER (John). Arms Control : Crisis or Compromise. 
Foreign Affairs. 63, 5; 1985; 1036-49. 
The issue of arms control are too extensive and the 
underlying hostility too great to allow an immediate, 
comprehensive solution. Compromise must be achieved through 
a series of partial measures, each of which balance force 
reductions and modernization restrictions. Recent arms 
control negotiations have not focused on a balanced but 
limited combination of force reductions and weapon moderni-
zation restrictions, and that has virtually precluded 
success. 
, AFRICA 
2. ADENIRAN (Tunde) and STOFFER (Howard). Africa and arms 
control : a new perspective. Standford Jl of Int. Law. 
17, 1; 1981; 163-81. 
Examines the relationship of African arms imports to 
the international arms regime, to African domestic politics, 
and to domestic economies. Authors provide insight into the 
uses and sources of arms in sub-Saharan Africa. The authors 
conclude by suggesting that only a regional approach to arms 
control in Africa can successfully place the African problem 
on the international agenda and secure Africa's arms control 
objectives during the coming decade. 
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, after COLD WAR 
3. JERVIS (Robert). Arms Control, Stability, and causes of 
War. Political Science Quarterly. 108, 2; 1993; 239-53. 
Arms control in post cold-war era must be pursued as 
an adjunct to, not a substitute for ways of dealings with 
sources of conflict and methods of managing disputes. While 
some of the potential causes of war are likely to lie with 
in the military arena, there is little reason to believe 
they will be the most potent ones. 
, , , USA-USSR 
4. NYE (Joseph S, Jr). Arms control after cold war. Foreign 
Affairs. 65, 5; 1989-90; 42-46. 
The changing nature of world politics suggests a new 
role and a new importance for arms control. East-west 
tensions have eased, and an international diffusion of power 
is occurring, the past focus on US-Soviet arms control will 
not be sufficient in the future, although locking in the 
gains of previous and on going arms negotiations with the 
USSR is critical, it will also be necessary to construct 
enduring multilateral regimes to deal with emerging problems 
of proiferation of weapons. Preventing the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons 
will become increasingly important. Arms control should 
attempt to slow the spread of dangerous technologies in 
order to gain to better manage their destabilizing effects. 
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, AGREEMENTS 
5. FLOWERREE (Charles C). On lending arms control agreement. 
Washington quarterly. 13, 1; 1990; 199-214. 
Arrangement for insuring that arms control agreement 
survive and adapt to changing conditions after they enter in 
to force have not received the degree of attention the 
subject deserves. Arms control treaties need verification 
and compliance arrangement that protect the security of the 
states concerned, provide a low-key channel for raising 
compliance question and instill confidence in public that 
their interests are being protected. 
, USSR-USA 
6. KOUBI (Vally). International tensions and arms control 
agreements. Amer. Jl of Pol. Sc. 37, 1; 1993, Feb; 
148-64. 
Examines how the level of tensions in the 
relationship between the US and USSR (measured by the 
conflict and peace Data Bank) influences - and is 
subsequently influenced by the timing of the occurrance of 
arms control agreements (ACA). Using problt analysis, it 
establishes that low to moderate levels of tensions and 
disputes have had an adverse effect on the probability of 
occurrance of an arms control agreement. 
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internationalization of the Polar Basin seems inevitable in 
the long run, and it is inconceivable that it could proceed 
without some form of restriction on military activities in 
the area. In the Antarctic the need is to preserve what has 
already been gained in the way of an arms control regime. 
, ARMS RACE, USSR-USA 
9. WEISS (Seymour). Case against arms control. Commentary. 
78, 5; 1984, Nov; 19-23. 
Arms control can not stop the arms race because in 
no real sense has there been any such thing as an arms race. 
Since there has been no arms race as far as the US is 
concerned. Arms control has not prevented the USSR from 
forging ahead in its military programs. Arms control is not 
desirable in that it does not serve the security need of the 
US, does not save money, and does not lessen the risk of 
war. 
, ASIA 
10. SEGAL (Gerald). Arms Control in Asia. Arm Control. 8, 1; 
1987, May; 80-94. 
If the geopolitical trend of history is a guide, 
then Asia has something to learn from Europe in its 
transition from economic boom and devastating war to armed 
peace and controlled conflict. Is Asia now ripe to begin 
considering various type of arm control that had been used 
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, VERIFICATION 
7. GARNETT (J.C) Risks associated with univerifiable arm 
control treaties. Arms Control. 7, 3; 1986; Dec; 241-70. 
Most significant arm control treaties can only be 
verified imperfectly. Statement who sign them inevitably 
take the risk of evasion. In the context of, projected arm 
control agreement, how likely is evasion? if it happen does 
it matter? it is important to understand term like "adequate 
verification" and to appreciate the thought process involved 
in assessing the risk of evasion. We need to judge not 
only the livelihood of evasion, but also the dangers 
resulting from evasion, and we need to combine those 
calculation in some way, which involves the greater risk the 
evasion which is less likely, but more serious, or an 
evasion which is more likely but less serious? These and 
other analytical issues, are examined in the context of 
current negotiations - practically in a area of chemical 
disarmament, a comprehensive test ban and mutual force 
reduction. 
, ARCTIC-ANTARCTIC 
8. PURVER (Ron). Security and arms control at the poles. 
International journal. 39, 4; 1984; 888-910. 
The possibilities for arms control in the Arctic are 
not totally hopeless and should be positively cultivated 
rather than discouraged. Some degrees of 
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in Europe and between the super power to help keep the 
peace? The immediate answer must be no, because Asia is 
obviously a very different place, and with very different 
problems. 
, ASIA-PACIFIC and INDIAN OCEAN 
11. ARBATOV (Alexei G). Arms limitation and the situation in 
the Asian-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Asian 
Survey. 24, 11; 1984, Nov; 1108-16. 
The deployment of large quantities of nuclear weapon 
in the Asian-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions presents 
tremendous danger to the countries of the regions. It is 
essential to define appropriate forms for US participation 
in the system of confidence building measures in East Asia 
on the condition that the US demonstrate a desire to avoid 
explosive situations. The normalization of relations between 
the countries of these regions does not require the 
cooperation of all the countries affected. 
, CENTAL AMERICA 
12. GOLDBLAT (Jozef) and MILLIAN (Victor). Arms Control in 
Central America. ArmsControl. 8, 1; 1987, May; 73-79. 
Detailed proposals for stopping and reversing the 
militarization of the Central American Isthmus were put 
forward in the 1986 draft contradora Act on peace and 
cooperation in central America. The risk of military 
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confrontation between Nicara9aa and its closest neighbour as 
well as the likelihood of direct US intervention, feared by 
Nicaragua, would have been considerably reduced. Limitation 
of armaments would have been coupled with confidence 
building undertakings. However, the position of the 
antagonistic proved to be too far apart to transform the 
draft Contadora Act into a binding international documents. 
, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL 
13. ROBINSON (J P Perry). Negotiations on chemical-warfare 
arm control. Arms Control. 1, 1; 1980, May; 30-52. 
The idea of eradicating chemical warfare by inter-
national treaty must now be seen to have a precarious 
future. Arms control is not but one of the routes whereby 
states can seek to improve their security against the 
possibility of adversary chemical warfare. Decision about 
the allocation of resources to the military routes of 
defence and especially deterrance, will eventually become 
irreconcilable with decisions necessitated by the 
negotiations. Chemical warfare is becoming a major focus of 
arms control. 
, USA 
14. DUNN (Lewis A) . Chemical weapon arms control ; hard 
choices for the Bush administration. Survival. 31, 3; 
1989, May-June; 209-24. 
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In the coming months, G Bush will need to confront 
the hard choice of whether to reaffirm his earlier support 
for a complete and total chemical weapon ban, or to shift US 
policy towards more modest objective. This will require 
striking a balance between the risks of a chemical weapon 
convention and its potential payoffs, between most 
especially the potential military risks of undetected Soviet 
chemical weapon production and the benefits of a convention 
in bringing under control the spread of chemical weapon 
throughout conflict-prone third-world regions. Rather than 
stepping back from his earlier views, Bush should make clear 
that the rapid conclusion of a complete and total ban 
remains the top US priority in chemical weapon arms control. 
, CONVENTIONALDISARMAMENT, REGIONAL 
15. ROSAS (Allan). Conventional disarmament - A legal 
framework and some perspective. Current research on 
peace and violence. 4, 4; 1981; 257-86. 
The article purports to set out a general legal 
frame work for conventional disarmament and arms control, 
taking into account international legal norms in force as 
well as proposal for new norms. Separate attention is paid 
to the question of planning, research and development, 
production, international, transfer, possession and 
stockpiling, stationing and employment in peace- and 
wartime. At the end, some reflections are offered on the 
present political perspective for conventional disarmament. 
It is obvious that no dramatic result will be achieved in 
the near future. It might be possible to obtain some 
guidelines for international arms transfers and further 
restrictions on the use of certain weapon in war. The 
regional approach is particularly suited for conventional 
disarmament. 
, CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
16. TAYLOR (Trevor). Conventional arms control - a threat to 
arms procurement? The world today. 45, 7; 1989, July; 
121-4. 
Two trends are apparent in contemporary security 
affairs : theimproving prospects for arms control and the 
continued pressure on defense equipment budgets. While some 
arguments can be advanced that arms control will have little 
impact on procurement, other considerations suggest that 
arms control, in tandem with continuing detente, is likely 
to mean diminished equipment budgets and a preference for 
"non-offensive" equipment. In such a world, defense 
companies in Europe are likely to be hit needed for the 
continued viability of European defense industrial 
capabilities. 
, , AIR POWER,EUROPE, WARSAW PACT 
17. MASON (R A). Airpower in conventional arms control 
Survival. 31, 5; 1989, Sept-Oct; 397-413. 
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At the beginning of the negotiations on conventional 
armed forces in Europe of Vienna in 1989, the USSR wished to 
include land-based combat aircraft and maritime forces in 
the consideration of ground forces of both alliance. Not 
long in to the negotiations, there were indications that 
hitherto intractable positions could be modified, and that 
both sides had come to realize that the residual impact of 
airpower, especially after ground force reductions, would be 
so great that it could not longer be ignored. A reduction in 
the numerical superiority in aircraft and bases of the 
Warsaw treaty organization would not only ehanced western 
security, but would also lead directly to greater mutual, 
co-operative security and stability in Europe. 
, CFE, NATO and WARSAW PACT 
18. DEAN (Jonathan). Defining long-term western objectives 
in CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]. Washington 
Quarterly, 13, 1; 1990; 169-84. 
Negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on 
reducing conventional armed force in Europe (CFg) opened in 
Vienna in March 1989. An agreement providing for massive 
reduction of Warsow Pact ground force armaments appears 
feasible within the next two to three years. With more 
agreement within NATO on long term aims of the reduction 
process on some concept of an east-west security system for 
all of Europe, it will be possible to move more smoothly to 
an early first agreement in the CFE talks, and beyond that a 
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second successful stage of negotiations on deep cuts in the 
force of both alliances. 
, , DISARMAMENT and TECHNOLOGY 
19. SIMPSON (John). New Conventional weapon technologies and 
conventional disarmament. ArmsControl• 6, 1; 1985, May; 
82-96. 
Emerging technologies are seen as a means of amelio-
rating many of western Europes security problems little 
thought has been given to the implications of these 
development of the prospects for conventional arms control 
however. An analysis is offered of the nature of these nev? 
technologies and their linkages with changing Soviet and 
NATO military doctrines, nuclear deterrence and nuclear 
disarmament. The problems of negotiating global conventional 
arms limitations are then discussed and the impact of 
emerging technologies upon them. 
, , EUROPE 
20. GALVIN (John R). Some thoughts on conventional arms 
control. Survival. 31, 2; 1989, Mar-Apr; 99-107. 
Reaching conventional arms stability in Europe is 
likely to be a long and fifficult process. Although Western 
concerns are focused on the possibilities of arms 
reductions, there is room for an expanded set of confidence 
and security building measures. One of the most important 
tasks that will face Alliance members during the period of 
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negotiations will be their continued support of forward 
defense and Flexible Response. The political and military 
realities that demand the ability to defend along the NATO-
Pact boundaries will be as important after an agreement is 
reached as they are before. 
21. MACDONALD (Hugh). Conventional arms control in Europe. 
Arms Control. 2, 3; 1981, Dec; 284-312. 
Explains the problems of conventional arms control 
in Europe. The nature of arms stability is held to stream 
from the general nature of East-West relations; the 
deterrent functions of conventional forces are emphasised. 
The nature of regional arms control, by contrast, is held to 
depend more upon intra-alliance considerations of interest 
than upon consideration of East-West arms stability. An 
examination of the record of negotiations in MBFR and on 
CBNs is held to reveal an inapposite approach and structure; 
directed towards creating a visible equality in the most 
important measures of military power". 
22. MOORE (James W) . Estimation of optimum force size and 
force reduction potential in conventional arms reduction 
negotiations. Arms Control. 9, 2; 1988, Sept; 116-33. 
It has long been realized that arms control and 
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defense policies can not be pursued in isolation, close 
coordination and harmonization of these policies are 
essential to achieve stability in force-balances at the 
lovest levels possible without jeopardizing the requirement 
for a secure defense. In particular, proposals for force 
reduction in east-west conventional arms reductions 
negotiations must be consonent with the force requirement 
needed to preserve the security of the NATO region. By using 
the concept of force to space rations as a standard for 
sizing NATO defensive force, it is possible to estimate the 
force requirement of the alliance in the central region and 
to identify the force reduction potential from current force 
levels deployed in the NATO guidelines area. 
, in relation to PEACE-PLAN, MIDDLE-EAST 
23. DIXIT (Aabha). Mid-East peace plan : why arms control 
needs top billing? Strategic Analysis. 15, 7; 1992, Oct; 
625-42. 
The Middle-East along with South Asia has been the 
largest conventional arms market in the third world. Despite 
the Welter of evidence that supports the facts of arms trade 
being a retardant to economic and social development and 
the principal causative factor for inter-state tensions, the 
dividing line over whom to blame for this problem has never 
been bridged. There is now a need to create an arms control 
regime incorporating suppliers and users, that is equitable 
at the base, and most importantly offers a feeling of 
enhanced security through unanimously arrived decisions. 
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, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, EUROPE 
24. PETERS (John). International relations theory and 
European conventional arms control : practical linkages. 
European Security. 1, 2; 1992; 109-25. 
Traditional arms control measures will be inade-
quates for European security requirements in years ahead. 
There remains an important role for conventional arms 
control in Europe though they stretch previous nation of 
arms control and traditional understanding of security 
issues. Arms control measures must be constructed to 
mitigate, temper, and settle the conflict that threaten 
peace. A European conventional arms control agenda should 
seek to create measure for local and bilateral applications 
as well as and pan-European application. 
, KOREA-USA 
25. INENDT (James C). Conventional arms control for Korea : 
a proposed approach. Survival. 34, 2; 1992-93; 108-24. 
Arms control agreements between North and South 
Korea would improve not only the stability of Korean 
peninsula, but that of the entire region. A stable, but 
pagile, security environment currently exists, which depends 
largely on the prominent role played by the US. With the end 
of the cold war, the US still has a part to play on the 
penisula : promoting south Korean security by deterrring the 
North from aggressian. Thus arms control agreements should 
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be designed to help maintain a continuing US presence in 
Korea and reduce or eliminate threat from the North. 
, MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION 
26. BRAYTON (Abbott). MBFR and conventional forces 
reductions in Europe. The World Today. 40, 12; 1984, 
Dec; 497-507. 
The mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) 
conference opened in Vienna in October 1973. Since that time 
dkespite considerable dialogue and proposal, there has been 
neither treaty nor substantive arms reductions in Europe. An 
analysis of MBFR proposals and East-West perceptions is 
followed by both statistical and strategic implication of 
proposed reduction. (MBFR) can be successful with some 
adjustment both to the negotiating strategy and to 
substantive proposal. Despite the greater public awareness 
of nuclear arms issues, conventional force reduction should 
be an issue of greater priority with in the contending 
government. 
, , POLITICS, EUROPE 
27. FREEDMAN (Lawrence). Politics of Conventional arms 
control. Survival. 31, 5; 1989, Sept-Oct; 387-96. 
Prgress has been made in the Vienna talks on 
conventional armed forces reduction in Europe (CFE) which 
has fueled enthusiasm for conventional arms control in 
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general. It is now widely assumed that the political will is 
available for a conventional arms reduction treaty. Much of 
the current optimism is based on the presumption that the 
USSR has decided to play a for less overbearing role in 
eastern Europe, to abandon the brezhnev doctrine, and to 
reduce its garrison accordingly. Yet if this process is 
takes much further, the basic political framework assumed by 
arms control will no longer obtain. 
, REDUCTION TALKS, EUROPE 
28. BLACKWILL (Robert D) . Conventional stability talks : 
specific approaches to conventional arms control in 
Europe. Survival. 30, 5; 1988, Sept-Oct; 429-47. 
For the first time in the post war period, 
negotiated reductions of conventional forces in Europe have 
emerged in public discourse as a real possibility. The most 
pertinent question for NATO in any possible scenario whould 
be whether unilateral soviet withdrawals reduced Soviet 
military capabilities concerning Wester Europe, not have 
much such cuts improved the East-West political climate. The 
NATO alliance's most urgent task is modernizing the aging US 
nuclear weapons in Europe in a way that ensures the vitality 
of Extended Deterrence and Flexibles Response until the end 
of the century and beyond. 
, , STABILITY EUROPE 
29. BORAWSKI (John). Toward Conventional stability in 
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Europe? The Washington Quarterly. 10, 4; 1987, 13-29. 
Despite the profound uncertainties surrounding 
the prospects for conventional arms control in Europe, an 
opportunity has emerged for a fresh examination of this 
neglected dimension of European security. The economic 
demographic and political pressures in both east and west 
for negotiated conventional arms control arrangement are 
very real. Although the outcome of conventional stability 
talks probably will not be known for many years, it is vital 
at this early stage that more attention be paid to the types 
of conventional arms control outcome NATO should be seeking. 
, SURVEY 
30. MOODIE (Michael). Conventional arms control : an 
analytical survey of recent literature. Washington 
Quarterly. 12, 1; 1989; 189-201. 
The changing political environment toward 
conventional arms control has necessitated a review of past 
proposals to develop a new conceptual frame work. Drawing 
upon recent works on conventional arms control, a pattern of 
Soviet and Western objectives can be observed, including the 
various biases which each side brings to the negotiations. 
Models analyzing the force balance can also suggest a 
definition for stability in the European theater and how 
this might best be achieved. However, without a proper frame 
work, arms control proposals are made in isolation from the 
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rest of security environment and therefore threaten to 
undermine, rather than increase, East-West stability. 
, USSR 
31. KIPP (Jacob W) . Soviet military doctring and conven-
tional arms control. Military Review. 68, 12,; 1988, 
Dec; 2-23. 
The soviet, through general secretary and president 
Mikhail Gorbachev, have made what appears to be unprecen-
dented concessions on arms control and conventional force 
issue. Far these initiative legitimate expressions of "new 
thinking" or are they simply steps carefully designed to 
obtain a "breathing space" for soviet strategists to 
implement qualitative changes to their doctrine and force 
structure? The Soviets have already mounted a sophisticated 
and well integrate compaign to reshape the international 
security system to soviet advantage. 
and EUROPE 
32. ALLISON (Roy). Current Soviet views on conventional arms 
control in Europe. Arms Control. 9, 2; 1988, Sept; 
134-69. 
New soviet initiatives on conventional arms control 
in 1986-87 were accompanied by a gradual soviet acceptance 
of the existence of asymmetries in the conventional balance. 
"Reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defence" have 
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emerged as key concepts in an interval soviet civilian-
military debate on necessary force levels. A close 
examination of Soviet debate over unilateral force 
reductions before autumn 1988 and an identification of the 
benefits the USSR could derive unilateral action suggests 
the likelihood of a soviet initiative along these lines 
regardless of Soviet commitment to new multilateral 
conventional arms negotiations. 
, , USSR-WEST 
33. KAISER (Karl). Conventional arm control : the future 
agenda. The World today. 44, 2; 1988, Feb; 22-27. 
As the west enters the new phase of conventional 
arms control it will have to reconcile its activities in 
three complex areas : the preservation and, possibly, 
restructuring of the nuclear prerequisites for conventional 
arms control : the persuit of conventional arm control 
proper starting with a debate on military doctrine and 
confidence-building measures; and, the improvement of its 
own force, structural and internal alliances arrangements. 
Western policy should engage reform and change of military 
policies in the USSR. But western concessions can only come 
as a consequence of significant soviet moves. 
, DEFENCE POLICY, ABM, 1980's 
34. BURT (Richard). Relevance of arms in the 1980's, 
Dardalus. 101, 1; 1981; 159-77. 
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Although it has become conventional wisdom that arms 
control considerations should be taken into account in 
shaping defense policy and programs, little thought is given 
to how existing negotiations should be adapted to changing 
military realities. The possibility of revising arms control 
arrangements to bring them more into line with emerging 
realities should to be overlooked in the next few years. 
Revision of the ABM treaty to facilitate the deployment of 
hard-site missiles is an interesting option. 
, DISARMAMENT 
35. BURNS (Richard D). Arms control and disarmament : terms 
and resources. Peace and Change. 8, 1; 1982; 53-63. 
Arms control techniques are divided into six 
categories : (1) limitation and reduction of weapons; (2) 
demilitarization, denuclearization and neutralization; (3) 
arms manufacture and traffic; (4) Outlawing specific 
weapons; (5) rules of war; (6) Stabilizing international 
environment. Methods of achieving arms control are defined 
as : (1) retributive measures; (2) unilateral measures; and 
(3) reciprocal measures. 
36. FORSBERG (Randal). Confining the military to defence as 
a toute to disarmament. World Policy Journal. 1, 2; 
1984; 285-318. 
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IXL order to__ achieve a stable disarmed peace, the 
requirements for armed forces must be eliminated by ending 
the popular acceptance of certain functions of military 
force and by transforming other functions so that they can 
be fulfilled by non-military institutions. The only way to 
do this is to constrain the functions of armed forces 
gradually, eliminating the need for some first while 
allowing others two persist longer. If military force were 
maintained strictly for national defence people would over 
time being to believe that atavistic, war-making tendencies 
would not resurface. 
, COOPERATION 
37. COFFEY (John W.). Armscontrol dialogue. Defense Analysis, 
3, 3; 1987, Sept; 225-31. 
For years the multilateral arm control process (e.g. 
the UN, the conference of disarmament in Geneva, the 
conference on security and cooperation in Europe) has 
provided an Extravagent, self perpetuating, irresponsible 
gabfast for the benefit of the professional arm-controllers. 
However, the process has promoted ideas harmfull to western 
security : that wars arise principally from miscalculation 
and misperception : that arms, not aggressive regimes, cause 
wars, that nuclear weapons, not totalitarianism, are the 
chief threat in the world today; that "the superpowers" are 
morally equivalent; that force can be eliminated from 
international relations. 
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, USSR-USA, 1950's 
38. EVANGELISTA (Mathew). Cooperation theory and disarma-
ment negotiation in the 1950s. World Politics. 41, 5; 
1990, July; 502-28. 
Soviet-American disarmament negotiations of the mid-
1950, provide a critical case for evaluating theories of 
cooperation such as Tit for Tat and GRIT. Although both 
sides were close to agreement on the main term of a treaty 
by May 1955, the negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful. 
On the basis of declassified US documents, it now appear 
that the US did not favor an agreement at the time : Thus 
the games was not Prisioners Dilemma, but deadlock. The case 
reinforces the criticism of Tit for Tat that its unitary 
actor assumption ignores domestic second-image pressures for 
arming. The importance of understanding the link between 
internal political coalitime and external bargaining 
strategies is emphasized. 
, EUROPE 
39. SAKAMOTO (Yoshikazu). New dimensions of disarmament 
processes. Japan Quarterly. 29, 2; 1982, Apr-Jun; 169-75, 
Domestic public opinion should be strengthened and 
mobilized in order to counteract the international armament 
dynamic and those national interest group which support arms 
buildup. This is a level on which disarmament processes 
should be generated in the light of the growing despersion 
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of political power both internally and internationally. If 
it had not been for the strong citizen's movement in Europe. 
The begining of disarmament talks would have been much 
delayed. 
, , CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1970's 
40. BROZ (Lvan). Czechoslovak Socialist republic and dis-
armament : Profile of the year 1971-81. International 
relations (Prague). 1982; 15-28. 
During the 1970s Czechoslovak is made systematic 
efforts designed to contribute to the attainment of a more 
secure and socially equitable world. Although Czechoslovakia 
does not possess nuclear weapon and dose not have such 
weapon deployed on its territory, it is virtually interested 
in the proceeding and result of negotiations having the 
objective of limiting the stockpiling of lethal weapons and 
their proliferation. 
, , influence on ECONOMY, USSR-USA. 
41. DUMAS (Lloyd J). Disarmament and economy in advanced 
industrialized countries - The US and the USSR. Bulletin 
of Peace Proposals. 12, 1; 1981, Mar; 1-10. 
A centrally planned socialist economy is no more and 
no less able to overside the negative economic effects of 
military spending than a capitalist economy. The only way to 
redevelop an economy severely stressed by the burden of 
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military spending is to rechannel resources back into 
productive civilian activity. The economic damaye being done 
to both the US and soviet economics by the continued 
escalation of the arms race is cumulative. 
, , HUMAN RIGHTS 
42. EVERTS (Philip P). Some notes on the connection between 
disarmament and human rights. Bulletin of Peace 
Proposals. 12, 3; 1981; 271-5. 
At least six perspectives or theories can be 
distinguished between disarmament and humcm rights and is 
restricted to the European setting. (1). Disarmament is a 
condition of human rights. (2) Human rights are a condition 
of disarmament. (3) Disarmament is an obstacle to human 
rights. (4) Armaments are a defense of human rights. (5) 
Insistence on disarmament is an obstacle to human rights. 
(6) A dialectical relationship exists between disarmament 
and the promotion of human rights. 
, relation to ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CHINA 
43. TAI (Ming cheung). Disarmament and development in China: 
the relationship between national defense and economic 
development. Asian Survey. 28, 7; 1988, Jul; 757-74. 
Chinese defense strategy is gradually shifting away 
from relying as shear weight of number to emphasizing the 
need for a more technological, mobile, three dimensional and 
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machine oriented posture. This reflects changing threat 
perceptions. For as the country modernizes, its security 
interests will become increasingly regional, whether in 
defending sealanes, offshore resources, and contested 
islands or protecting allied states from Soviet and other 
third power - mainly Indian and Vietnamese influence. While 
it is difficult to isolate and measure the impact of 
military reduction process on development, especially when 
many of the measures have yet to take noticeable effect, it 
can already be seen to have made important contributions to 
the overall economy. 
, WAR-NUCLEAR 
44. TZANOS (Constantine P). Nuclear war and nuclear disarma-
ment. Jl of Pol, and Military Sociology. 16, 1; 198 8; 
91-104. 
At the size of the current nuclear arsenals any 
nuclear attact involving the superpowers most likely would 
lead to an uncontrollable large scale nuclear war. The 
immediate human toll of this war surpass one billion of 
deaths and one billion of injured. It claims diseases after 
war on global scale. Nuclear deterrence, either in the form 
of mutually assured destruction or of limited nuclear war, 
cannot preclude the likelihood of a full-scale nuclear war. 
Nuclear disarmament and the establishment of deterrence at a 
level of conventional arms is better option than nuclear 
deterrance and SDI. This option can be realised if both 
superpowers have the will to pursue it. 
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, INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT FUND 
45. THEE (Marek). Establishment of an International Disarma-
ment Fund for Development - A feasibility study. 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals. 12, 1; 1981, Mar; 52-100. 
There is a need for some practical expression of the 
benefits which can accure by linking disarmament with 
development. The establishment of an International 
Disarmament Fund for Development would help to institu-
tionalize creative forms of interdependence between 
developed and developing countries. The establishment of the 
fund would be a political act which cannot be imposed on the 
international community. The requirement of practicality 
should take precedence over ideal principles of equity. 
, , JAPAN 
46. TOYODA (Toshiyuki). Beyond the mind-set of deterrance to 
genuine disarmament. Japan Quarterly. 39, 3; 1993, 
Jul-Sept; 290-302. 
To carryout general and complete disarmament, the 
world needs a convincing plan for the post-disarmament 
international system so that disarmament does not give rise 
to new anxieties. The world needs institutives for 
maintaining peace and settling internationals disputes by 
peaceful means - a world government. One step towards such a 
govt, world be for nations to amend their constitutions to 
contain passage renouncing the possessions of weapons and 
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waging of war. The preamble of Japan's constitution and 
Article I provide a vision for the world after general and 
complete disarmament. 
, KOREA 
47. LEE (Ki-taik). Disarmament on the Korean Peninsula and 
the position of the four major powers. Korea Journal. 
30, 4; 1990, Apr; 21-38. 
The purpose of this thesis is (1) to discuss disarma-
ment on the Korean peninsula and the problems it entails; 
(2) to examine the position and reaction of the four major 
powers arms reduction or arms control on the Korean 
peninsula can be approached with two conceptual framework : 
involuntary and voluntary disarmament. With the military 
environment on the Korean peninsula, the changing position 
of the US the USSR, China and Japan and regard to the arms 
reductions issue are discussed. They have adopted poicies 
based on a military balance and arms control approach. An 
involuntary approach in reducing tension and controlling 
arms on the peninsula is viewed to be,more effective than a 
voluntary approach. // ^'~ "'^~\^^\ 
'^CC ',0. 
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48. TOWLE (Philip). Disarmament ana=4i44.--tary decline. Arms 
Control. 1, 1; 1980, May; 64-75. 
The weaker a declining power is, the more it needs an 
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agreement to prevent other states from increasing their 
forces. But the weaker it is, the less it has offer in any 
bargain. The more anxious it appears to be to reach an 
agreement, the greater the chance that its rivals will 
prefer an arms are to a limitation of their forces. The 
discrepancy between a country apparent military power and 
its status enshrined in an arms control treaty cannot 
usually, therefore become too wide. 
, , NAM, view point 
49. PRASAD (Jayant). Non-aligned view of disarmament. IPSA 
Journal. 1691; 1984, July-Sep; 77-94. 
Disarmament has been one of the most important 
concerns of the Nonaligned Movement since the time of its 
inceptions. This concern was nurtured by the historical 
experience of the non-aligned countries whose endeavour has 
been to guard their newly was independence and remain 
outside the spheres of influence of the great powers. During 
the successive summit meetings over the years they have 
shown progressive sophistication in dealing with specific 
disarmament issues. Despite various inherent, limitations, 
they have constructively contributed to the disarmament 
debate through meadiation between the two super power, 
shaping the consensus in multilateral fora including the 
general assembly and the conference on disarmament and 
making people conscious of the threat of nuclear holocaust 
in an over-armed world. The Non-aligned movement has thus 
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become history's biggest peace movement. 
, NATO, in relation to USSR 
50. PASTUSIAK (Longin). Disarmament, arms control and East-
West relation. Polish Round Table. 9; 1979; 183-94, 
A policy of coexistence among power in the area of 
nuclear policy is taking shape. However, the increased 
sending on the part of NATO countries does not facilitate 
arms control negotiation the abandoning by the US of the 
basic goal of maintaining strategic supremacy over the USSR 
allowed for concluding many new agreement which limit the 
danger of nuclear war. In general, the question of detent 
between east and west is not at all theoretical, but of 
great practical importance. 
, , NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INF-TREATIES influence on 
ECONOMY 
51. JONES (Philip). Costs of disarmament treaties : a 
research note. Arms Control. 9, 3; 1988, Dec; 280-91. 
With reference to the INF treaty the question arises 
as to whether the removal of a specific range of weapon 
systems will be expected to increase or reduce the budgetary 
costs of defence. An analysis of the costs of disarmament 
treaties is illustrated. On the one hand, disarmament 
treaties may constrain the adoption of the most cost 
effective combination of weapon and thereby increase the 
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costs of providing particular levels of defense capability. 
On the other hand, if the treaty also constrains a potentian 
adversary, the desired level of defense capability may be 
reduced. As the treaty increases the price of defense 
capability, the price elasticity of demand for defense and 
the interdependence between signatory countries are both 
important considerations. 
52. BARANOVSKY (Vladimir). Perspectives of disarmament and 
detente in Europe after the INF Treaty, Peace and the 
Sciences, 1989; 1; 1-9. 
The INF treaty is an event of great significance for 
the evolution of disarmament and detente in Europe because 
it goes beyond simply imposing rules on the arms race and 
eliminates a whole category of weapons. Moreover the treaty 
provides a positive model for further progress in disarma-
ment negotiations and helps create the conditions necessary 
for rethinking the future of peace, security and development 
in the "Common European Home". 
, , PEACE MOVEMENT, USA 
53. BENFORD (Robert D) . Frame disputes with in the [US] 
nuclear Disarmament Movement. Social Forces. 71, 3; 
1993, Mar; 677-701. 
Social movement organizations (SMOs) devote 
considerable efforts to constructing particular version of 
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reality, developing and espousing alternative visions, and 
attempting to affect various audiences interpretation. 
Conflicts regarding such interpretive matters, referred to 
as "frame disputes" are uniquitous with in movements. Using 
a multimethod strategy, this study analyzes the dynamics of 
interorganizational frame disputes within the nuclear 
disarmament movement including their organizational and 
ideological contexts, conditions conducive to their 
emergence, patterns observed, and their effects. 
COUNTRIES 
54. SMITH (Chris). Disarmament, peace movement and the third 
world, Third World Quarterly. 6, 4; 1984, Oct; 892, 910. 
To suggest that the paucity of disarmament groups in 
the third world denotes the non-existence of a peace 
movement is far from correct. Where a peace movement can be 
identified in the struggle for a series of basic demand 
arising from the condition of underdevelopment - self-
determination, civil and human right ecocide, militarism, 
human and cultural survival. In addition, there are 
indications that a concern about the issue of disarmament 
exists on a popular level. 
, FOREIGN POLICY, POLAND 
55. MULTAN (Wajcieh). Disarmament issues in the foreign 
policy of People's Poland. International Relations 
(Warsaw). 1, 4; 1984; 69-86. 
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The phase of polish international activity in 
questions of disarmament generally correspond to the phase 
of polish foreign policy in the post-war period. Polish 
disarmament efforts were largely determined by the inter-
national situation and were particularly contingent on 
East-West relations, armaments policies of NATO states, 
notably the US and the FRG; and the socio-political 
situation in Poland. A survey of documentation of CSCE 
negotiations shows that polish diplomacy made good use of 
these platform to advance Poland's national interest and the 
interest of the whole socialist community, including it 
calls for universal and complete disarmament. 
, PROBLEMS 
56. FORSBERG (Randall). Obstacles to a stable disarmed 
peace: and how to set our priorities to overcome them. 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals. 15, 4; 1984; 333-39. 
Past disarmament efforts have failed because they 
have given too little weight to the role of nuclear weapons 
in influencing the use of conventional forces. They have 
made no attempt to end the US of conventional forces as a 
tool of policy, and they have overlooked the fear of 
dismantling the weapon industries. US conventional forces 
have been besigned and used in a more interventionist manner 
than those of the USSR although arms debate in the west has 
incorrectly assumed that the US maintains military forces 
only for defence. 
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, SECURITY, EUROPE 
57. CHERNOFF (Fred). Negotiating security and disarmament in 
Europe. International Affairs (London). 60, 3; 1984; 
429-37. 
Meeting in Madrid, the 35 participants in the 
conference on security and cooperation in Europe reviewed 
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. At the rivier they 
mandated the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe 
(CDE) first proposed by France in 1978. In the face of 
strong opposition from the Warsaw Pact countries, the 
western nations remained unusually united in demanding 
important changes in the nature of the confidence building 
measures to be negotiated at the CDE. Unity was essential to 
the West's ability to pass the CDE proposal in much the form 
they wanted. Various western participants had differing 
perspectives on the objectives of a CDE which led them to 
adopt different approaches to dealing with the French CDE 
proposal. 
, STRATEGY, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
58. SUBRAHMANYAM (K), NAMBOODIRI (P.K.S.) and RIKHYE (Ravi). 
Struggle for disarmament. Strategic Analysis. 6, 1-2; 
1982, Apr-May; 1-160. 
The developing countries should adopt a strategy of 
non-confrontationist resistance to the industrial and 
heavily armed powers to bring about disarmament. 
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, SUPER-POWERS, SEA, 19 80's 
59. ROSS (Michael L). Disarmament at Sea. Foreign Policy. 
77; 1989-90; 94-112. 
There has been a gradual decline of superpower naval 
competition in the late 1980s. Despite the absence of any 
form of naval arms control, economic and political 
constraints have forced both the US and Soviet navies to 
change their leadership, trim their budgets, curtail 
operations overseas, and re-evaluate their fundamental 
purposes. Yet unless the two governments agree to limits on 
their naval forces, each will continue to build deploy naval 
weapons and vessels that the other finds threatenings more 
important unless the US reconsiders its opposition to naval 
arms control it will miss a critical opportunity to bring 
stability to the high seas and eliminate a troublesome 
category of nuclear weapons tactical naval nuclear weapons. 
, USSR-USA 
60. EVANGELISTA (Mathew). New Soviet approach to security. 
World Policy Journal. 3, 4; 1986; 561-99. 
Michail Gorbachev's disarmament proposals are part of 
a broader foreign policy campaign and a "new thinking" 
about international security. In order to reverse the 
Brezhnev legacy of a stragnating economy and a deteriorating 
foreign policy position, the new leadership has been willing 
to sacrifice previously perceived military requirement for 
the sake of political and economic benefit. Gorbachev 
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prefered outcome would be comprehensive arms control 
agreement alongs the lines laid out in his January 1986 
speech, although he has shown considerable flexibility in a 
number of its components. His goal include preventing an 
arms race in space and achieving US participation in a 
nuclear test moratorium that the Soviet have mentioned 
unilaterally since August 1985. The unwillingness of the 
Reagan administration to pursue these objectives means that 
it is now up to the US congress to maintain restraints on 
the arms race through tacit cooperation with the Soviet. 
INDIA influence by USA 
61. KAMATH (FM). Politics and national security : American 
influence on Indian thinkifig. IPSA Journal. 16, 3 ; 
1984, Jan-Mar; 273-85. 
American ideas had considerable influence on Indian 
political process and national security thinking. Such 
influence is seen in the constitutional provisions relating 
to fundamental right's, pressure groups with reference to 
environmental protection, civil liberties and anti-
advocated creation of a national security council on the 
American model. Similarly, public funding of election's is 
advocated. While any innovative new idea can be borrowed, 
the notion that all American ideas are impracticable need 
to be given up. 
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, influence of, ARMS TRANSFER, NORTH-SOUTH 
62. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Export controls and north-south 
controversy. Washington Quarterly. 16, 2; 1993; 135-44. 
Export controls are used increasingly by individua-
lized countries to prevent nuclear and missiles prolifera-
tion in the developing world. This is not likely to be 
effective against the background of breakdown of former 
soviet arsenas, the efforts of China to earn hard currency 
and the growing commercial and technological compeletion 
amongs the industrialized countries, as demonstrated by 
illegal exports to Iraq, Pakistan and South-Africa. A more 
effective method is to have a treaty in addition to NPT. 
, US-PAK 
63. PAUL (TV). Influence through arms transfers : lessons 
from US-Pakistani relationship. Asian Survey. 32, 12; 
1992, December; 1078-92. 
Explains the conditions under which a supplier can 
develop structural and decisional influence over a 
recipient. The US attempts at influencing Pakistan, 
especially its nuclear weapons decisions, during 1979-91. 
It period are examined. It concludes that the success rate 
of influence attempts has been mixed as Pakistan often 
succeeded in reversely influencing the US to receive better 
weapons systems, largely due to the structural conflict 
that Washington was engaging with the USSR in Afghanistan. 
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, in relation to, POLITICS, USSR 
64. GUERTNER (Gary L). Soviet leadership succession and the 
politics of arms control compliance. Defense Analysis. 
5, 1; 1989, Mar; 45-3. 
For American arms control negotiators and their 
subsequent judgement about Soviet compliance behaviour, in 
particular during periods of leadership succession the 
manner in which the USSR organizes itself to conduct the 
business of arms control is of great importance. It is 
necessary to examine and draw some general propositions 
about the bureaucratic politics and organizational routines 
followed by the Soviet communist party, the military and 
the strategic forces research and development 
infrastructure. 
, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, POST COLD-WAR 
65. RENGGER (NJ). Arms, control, International Society, and 
the end of the cold war. Arms Control. 13, 1; 1992, 
Apr; 32-57. 
Hedley Bull, author of the control of the Arms Race, 
linked arms control to international society. He saw the 
danger that arms control processes would increasingly work 
to support narrow particular interests of international 
society, as a whole. The prospects of arms control in post-
cold war era are likely to be enhanced if it is seen as 
process aimed at sustaining and strengthening international 
society rather than simply being an aspect of national 
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security strategies of individual powers. An arms control 
policy for the post cold war period must be part of a wider 
set of policy priorities, which includes a commitment to a 
more equal distribution of resources and power in 
international society. 
, ISRAEL 
66. INBAR (Efraim). Israel and arms control. Arms Control. 
13, 2; 1992, Sept; 214-21. 
There are sign of change in the traditional negative 
evaluation of arms control as a device for enhancing 
security in Israel's academic community as well as in its 
foreign affairs and defense establishments. The willingness 
to consider arms control more carefully is the result of 
the changing role of the US in the international system; 
the greater acceptance of the Jewish state in the middle-
east and the ensuing peace process; and new Israeli 
perceptions as to the limitation on the utility of 
available unilateral means for providing national security. 
, NATO, ALLIANCE 
67. CHERNOFF (Fred). Arms control, European security and 
the future of the western alliance. Strategic Review. 
20, 1; 1992; 19-31. 
The western alliance will have an important role to 
play in the comming years, despite arguments that the end 
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of the cold war is the time to dissolve the European 
alliances. Military forces will be form a smaller part of 
overall security, but they will not become altogether 
irrelevant. Efficient military planning and arms control 
remain goals of western states, and NATO facilitates both. 
Consideration of NATO's past performance coordinating arms 
control positions together with present arms control 
reduction aims shows that NATO remains well-designed for 
such tasks in the foreseeable future. If, in the more 
distant future several key condition are met, western 
security will be most effectively pursued without NATO. 
, NEGOTIATIONS 
68. NEILD (Robert). Case against arms negotiations and for 
a reconsideration of strategy. Arms Control. 7, 2 ; 
1986, Sep; 133-55. 
Negotiations over arms levels presuppose that Balance 
in arms is needed for security and is attainable. Both 
presumption are wrong. If political objectives are peaceful 
the rational requirement for nuclear forces is sufficiency; 
and for nuclear forces, where there is some choice between 
defensive and offensive forces, the rational requirement is 
defensive superiority. To attain these, independant action 
by each side and cooperative dialogue between them are the 
prime avanues of circumstances, the nature of which is also 
cursed. 
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, SUPER-POWERS 
69, WINDOR (Philip). Towards a hierarchy for arms control. 
Millenmium, 15, 2; 1986; 169-77. 
If arms control negotiations between the super power 
are to be successful they must be restructured and placed in 
a wider context. Hierarchy of negotiations on strategic 
stability and ending with talks on conventional forces, the 
conventional aspect should be the starting point. Moreover, 
it is necessary to place arms control negotiations in the 
context of greater interchange in other fields, to help 
alleviate the distrust which has resulted in past failure to 
achieve agreement between the superpower. 
, NUCLEAR ACCORD, INDIA-PAKISTAN 
70, PASRICHA (PM), Ind-Pak nuclear accord. Strategic 
Analysis. 9, 12; 1986, Mar; 1217-27. 
On all accounts, Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapon 
capability is now irreversible; not even the US can deter 
her. Hence, India must take appropriate counter measures 
including a matching nuclear response, to safeguard herself. 
Since neither country is willing or in a position to abandon 
its nuclear option, the only save course left is to shun a 
strike at each others nuclear facilities and live in mutual 
nuclear deterrence. Tis could extend to be deterrence of a 
conventional war as well, thus serving the cause of peace 
even if somewhat diabolically. Accordingly, despite the 
ongoing mutual mistrust, the Indo-Pak accord arrived at on 
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17 December 1985 could be regarded as the second block for 
building peace on the sub-continent, the Simla Agreement of 
1972 being the first. 
, NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, INDIA-PAK role of USA 
71. SETH (SPP). Indo-Pak nuclear duet and the United States. 
Asian Survey. 28, 7; 1988, July; 19-37. 
Against a back drop of strategic interests that 
appear to override US concern about Pakistan's nuclear path, 
both India and Pakistan seem destined to engage in a nuclear 
arms race. The social and economic costs to both countries 
are obvious enough, but the greatest danger lies in a 
possible regional blowup also involving the superpower. 
There is not much hope of a bilateral or international non-
proliferation solution the only hope for nuclear restraint 
lies in a voluntary freeze by both India and Pakistan on 
this weapons oriented programs wherever possible. At the 
same time, there is a great need to disengage the Indo-US 
relationship from its Pakistani shadow. 
, NUCLEAR, INDIA 
72. GHOSH (SK). India's nuclear programme. IPSA Journal. 17, 
2; 1984, Oct-Dec; 205-12. 
India has growing technical manpower base in the form 
of scientists, engineers, and technologists as well as a 
sound industrial base. Since it has not surrendered its 
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nuclear option, the sooner a beginning is made to utilize 
the spin-off benefits of nuclear and space technologies for 
the purpose of defense the better. In any case, greater 
coordination among the Department of Atomic energy, the 
Indian space research organization, the electronics 
commission and the Defence research and development 
organization is essential. The coordination should be 
maximum since it will keep the nation ready and vigil and 
will not put the country in a tight corner as and v/hen the 
necessity for resisting the nuclear option arises. 
, NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
73. BAILEY (Sydney D) . Paradoxes and predicciments of nuclear 
weapons. The World Today. 37, 1; 1981, Jan; 1-7. 
In the first two decades of the nuclear era, it was 
believed that a major barrier to escalation was the fire-
break between conventional and nuclear weapons. This has now 
been eroded by the development of battlefield and tactical 
or theatre nuclear weapons. The weapons continuum is 
intended to enhance deterrence, but it facilitates 
escalation in war fighting if deterrence fails. If 
deterrence fails it will be dueto part to the increasingly 
cataclysmic nature of modern weapons. 
74. NITZE (Paul H). Objective of arms control. Survival. 27, 
3; 1985, May-Jun; 98-107. 
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Deterrence requires that a potential opponent be 
convinced that the problems, risks and costs of aggression 
for outweigh the gains he might hope to achieve, deterrence 
can function effectively is one has the ability, through 
defence and other miliary means, to deny the attacker the 
gains he might otherwise have to rekalize. The deterrent 
balance must be shifted from one which is based primarily on 
the punitive threat of devastating nuclear retaliation to 
one in which nuclear arms are greatly reduced on both sides 
and non-nuclear defences p]ay a greater and greater role. 
75. SLOCOMBE (Walter). Immediate agenda for arms control. 
Survival. 27, 5; 1985, Sep-Oct; 204-13. 
Nuclear winter remains as great a danger as ever. 
Deterrence by threat and not immunity from attack will have 
to remain the fundamental ultimate instrument of strategy. 
The capacity for flexibility can offer at least a 
theoretical possibility of avoiding ultimate escalation 
without conceding defeat. Some control but with necessary 
nuclear modernization and conventional defence programs as 
well. 
76. THEE (Marek). Problems of our nuclear predicament : arms 
control in crisis. Current research on peace and 
violence. 7, 2-3; 1984; 81-9. 
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Our predicament stems from the fact that the nuclear 
powers have implanted a nuclear doomsday machine on our 
globe. Not only are they reluctant to dismantle it : on the 
contrary, driven by fierce rivalry and the technological 
momentum, they are feverishly engaged in building up nuclear 
stockpiles still more. The operational imperatives of 
military R & D act to perpetuate the arms race projecting it 
far into the future. In conditions of a permanent revolution 
in military technology, nuclear deterrence evolved towards 
nuclear war-fighting. A change of direction is imperative, 
away from the exclusive focus of an military hardware, and 
toward a broader vision encompassing human development and 
cooperation as integral parts of international peace and 
security. 
, and CONVENTIONAL, USA 
77. LIBERMAN (Peter J) and THOMASON (Neil R.). No first use 
unknowable. Foreign Policy. 64, 1986; 17-36. 
No first use might lower the probability of going 
nuclear as it raises the probability of attack. Since noone 
can know whether fiddling with the first use doctrine will 
improve West European and US security, the west should 
persue the more difficult but more useful avanue of arms 
control. Bilateral reduction in conventional and nuclear 
forces in Europe, combine with a shift, toward unambigously 
defensive posture would decrease the risk of conventional 
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war and nuclear war, plussave money and personnel. The Regan 
administration will clearly not adopt no first use. After 
the 1988 election, the new administration would devote an 
enormous efforts to instituting a no-first use policy. 
, BARRIERS 
78. NELSON (Linden) and BEARDSLEY (George L.Jr.). Toward an 
interdisciplinary model of barriers to nuclear arms 
control. Social Science Journal. 24, 4; 1987; 375-88. 
The nuclear arm race is a powerful phenomenon with 
political, technical, historical, economic, and psychologi-
cal dimensions. Most analyzes concentrate on the political, 
technical, or historical dimensions to the neglect of the 
economic and psychological. This article seeks to correct 
this neglect, arguing that serious barriers to arm control 
arise from economic and psychological forces. 
, , DEVELOPMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA 
79. BARNABY (Frank) and WINDASS (Stan). Nuclear weapon 
development and the Geneva talks. Yearbook of World 
Affairs. 38; 1984; 277-94. 
The idea that a balance of nuclear war fighting 
capability could provide any kind of security is illusory. 
The idea that such a capability on either side could be 
ratified by treaty is bizarre in the extreme. The danger is 
not so much in the reality as in the perception of a nuclear 
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war winning and first-strike capability : and this 
perception is increasing. It is no longer possible to depend 
on the idea of balanced threat and counter-threat at every 
level as a possible basis for security or for arms control. 
, DIPLOMACY, INDIA-PAKISTAN, 1980's 
80. CHEEMA (Zafar Iqbal). Nuclear diplomacy in South Asia 
during the 1980's.Regional Studies. 10, 3; 1992; 53-66. 
Regional nuclear diplomacy in South Asia primarily 
originates from the interaction of the nuclear policies of 
India. Pakistan and the five nuclear wkeapons states. The 
Indian policy towards every meaningful nuclear arms control 
and disarmament solution in the 1980's reflected an inextri-
cable linkage to its claim for general and complete nuclear 
disarmament; however, because of the exclusiveness of 
general and complete disarmament as an attainable objective, 
India has been able to maintain a doctrine of nuclear 
ambiguity rejecting all of Pakistan; bilateral initiatives 
aimed at regional non-proliferation. India's covert 
nuclearization is gradually advancing under this doctrine of 
nuclear ambiguity. 
, DISARMAMENT 
81. PUGH (Michael C). Unilateral nuclear disarmament at Sea. 
Arms Control. 13, 1; 1992, Apr; 108-20. 
The decision of President George Bush in Sept 1991 to 
withdraw naval tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear 
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cruise missiles, from vessels at sea v/as a recognition that 
such weapons have no clear role. Britain and USSR/Russia 
reciprocated with similar naval nuclear disarmament 
decisions. Unilateralism promises to avoid the difficult 
issue of verification which could have prevented the 
accomplishment of an arms control treaty. However, important 
political goals would be served by a verification regime for 
naval systems. These include hampering any future efforts to 
reverse unilateral disarmament, developing confidence 
building measures and co-operating in the disposal of 
nuclear weapons. 
82. ROSE (Clive). Mutiple approaches to arms control and 
disarmament. The World Today. 38, 11; 1982, Nov; 422-29. 
Enumerates the nuclear deterrence is respnsible for 
the fact that there have been no world war for nearly four 
decades. This lack of a world war is not due to disarmament 
of either a multilateral or unilateral nature. There are no 
easy answer to the increasingly technical and complex arms 
control negotiations. Short of a major change in the state 
of East-West political relations. The maintenance of the 
present balance of terror is as much as can be realistically 
expected. 
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, BARRIERS 
83. PLOUS (Scott). Psychological and strategic barriers in 
present attempts at nuclear disarmament : a new 
proposal. Political psychology. 691; 1985, Mar; 109-33. 
The acute problem with respect to nuclear weapons is 
not their existence, but there numbers. Six strategic and 
psychological difficulties inherent in current solutions to 
this problem are examined followed by a new and somewhat 
different proposal. The new proposal consist of a 10 year, 
bilateral agreement between the US and the USSR coupled with 
a multilateral endorsement of the agreement open to all 
other countries. In the concluding section, a series of 
potential objection to the new proposal are raised and 
briefly discussed. 
, , , influence of SPACE TECHNOLOGY 
85. DEUDNEY (Daniel). Forging missiles in to spaceships. 
World Policy Journal. 2, 2; 1985; 271-303. 
Today's nuclear abolitionists will have trouble 
advancing their program of disarmament until some 
alternative system for ensuring security and resolving 
disputes has been pioneered. Because the cooperative 
development of space technology efforts the opportunity to 
rechannel themomentum of the arms race and to creat at least 
an experimental working peace system, it deserves a central 
place in contemporary peace and security strategy. 
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, NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA 
86. VERONA (Sergui). Geneva disarmament negotiations as a 
learning process. Arms Control. 1, 1; 1980, May; 99-116. 
The Geneva conference on Disarmament is an excellant 
international structure with all the necessary attributes 
for the processes of reciprocal evaluation of military 
balances, for adjusting contemporary strategical doctrine 
and for establishing real communication links regarding the 
intentions and capabilities of all parties involved. 
However, the trends in the development of the arms race bear 
evidence to the fact that the strategy of nuclear deterrence 
cannot be a stabilizing factor in international relations 
and that it fails to ensure the security of states. 
, , PEACE MOVEMENT, COMPAIGN, UK 
87. BYRNE (Paul). The [UK] compaign for Nuclear Disarmament: 
the resilience of a Protest group. Parliamentary Affairs. 
40, 4; 1987, Oct; 517-35. 
Every British government since 1945 has held fast to 
the idea that the country should retain an independent 
nuclear deterrent albeit one closely linked to US nuclear 
strategy. Since the late 1950s the compaign for nuclear 
disarament (CND) has sought to reverse this policy. In the 
1960s the CND mobilized 100,000 people, but entered decline 
in the 1970s. Revived today, it has almost 100,000 members 
and has mobilized a quarter of a million supporters for mass 
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demonstration, since its renaissance after 1979 it is very 
visible in the national media and it help to make nuclear 
disarmament the most prominent feature of the 1983 general 
election. 
, role of AUSTRALIA 
88. BUTLER (Richard). Nuclear disarmament : does Australia 
have a role? Australian quarterly. 59, L; 1987; 91-7. 
Australia has sought and obtained leadership on major 
nuclear issues and acted independently on the basis of a 
clearly defined policy. It has influenced nuclear weapons 
states and some other key non-aligned states. It has played 
a major role in defending and strengthening the non-proli-
feration treaty (NPT), there have been new and creative 
approaches in order to break existing deadlocks Australia 
has been prepared to differ with major nuclear powers, 
including with its alliance partner, when the pursuit of 
disarmament policies required this. 
, UK 
89. FREED^1AN (Lawrence). Britain : The first ex-nuclear 
power? International security. 6, 2; 1981; 80-104. 
In the even that a government should come to power in 
Britain committed to unilateral nuclear disarmament, there 
would be difficulties in effecting the policy. It is 
important to recognize that the choice of the next British 
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government will be based for more on economic policy than 
defense policy. Britain is still far from turning itself in 
to an ex-nuclear power in the full meaning of the term, or 
even with reference to some national capacity for strategic 
deterrence. 
90. KEOHANE (Dan). British approaches to nuclear arms 
control and disarmament. Arms Control. 6, 1; 1985, May; 
58-81. 
This article explores three separate but related 
issue by reference to the current declared security policies 
of the major British political groups, namely the conser-
vative party. The labour party and the social democratic/ 
liberal alliance. (1) It delineates the views of 
multilateralists (i.e. the conservative party, the social 
democratic party, the leadership of the liberal party and a 
few senior labour party figures) and nuclear abolitionists 
(i.e. the labour party) regarding the political-diplomatic 
and military utility of nuclear weapon and the risks 
attached to reliance upon such arms. (2) The article 
explores how multilateralists and nuclear abolitionists 
judge East-West negotiations for the control and reduction 
of nuclear arms and it outlines the course each prescribes 
for such talks. (3) The cogency and consistency of the two 
approaches are examined. 
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, WARHEADS, LIMINATIONS VERIFICATION 
91. TAYLOR (theodere B). Verified elimination of nuclear 
warheads. Science and Global Security. 1, 1-8; 1989; 
1-26. 
The paper examines possibilities for verified 
disarmament and elimination of nuclear warheads as called 
for by possible future nuclear disarmament treaties. The 
principal focus here is on procedures to verify that 
warheads specified by treaty for elimination are, in fact, 
completely dismantled, their components randered useless for 
construction of new warheads, and the contained fissile 
materials placed under international safeguards or disposed 
of in such a manner as to make them unusable in weapon. 
, EUROPE 
92. DEAN (Jonathan). Military security in Europe. Foreign 
Affairs. 66, 1; 1987; 22-40. 
Conclusion of the intermediate range nuclear forces 
(INF) treaty may well lead to completion of an agreement on 
reductions of US and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, 
though probably in the succeeding US administrations. In the 
longer run, the military confrontation in Europe seems as 
likely to shrink through independent actions on both sides 
taken to rationalize forces and to cope with economic 
stringencies as it is through agreed reductions. Not only 
the political confrontation in Europe, but the military 
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confrontation too appears to have peaked. NATO government 
need to make a serious effort to achieve agreement with the 
Warsaw pact on negotiated force reductions. 
, , FREEZE 
93. MURAVCHIK (Joshua). Perils for a nuclear freeze. World 
Affairs. 145, 2; 1982; 203-7. 
Evaluates that an emerging imbalance of military 
power the danger of nuclear war is growing. Those who 
advocate a nuclear freeze are making more likely the very 
thing they wish to prevent. The alternative of American 
rearmament is not an end to the arms race, but rather a 
one-sided arms race. A policy of sure and steady deterrence 
offers the best hope for keeping the world safe from nuclear 
war. Deterrance can be reassured by determined American 
action to restore a stable balance of forces. 
94. SIGAL (Leon V). Warming to the freeze. Foreign Policy. 
48; 1982; 54-65. 
Stability is the measure of arms control. It takes 
three forms : strategic stability, crisis stability, and 
arms race stability. The conditions for strategic stability 
are presently met. A detailed examination of present and 
prospective weapons developments indicates that a freeze an 
deployment would have marginal effect on strategic 
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stability, not all of the positive. A freeze would halt a 
number of weapons programs which threaten crisis stability; 
at the same time it would perpetuate the present instability 
resulting from growing ICBM vulnerability. It would also 
damp dawn arms race instability somewhat. 
, , , PEACE MOVEMENT, USA 
95. TYGART (C.E). Participants in the nuclear weapons 
freeze movement. Social Science Journal. 24, 4; 1987; 
393-402. 
Explanation of why people participate in social 
movement are usually adhoc combinations of ideology, social 
support and ecological factors. This survey of californians 
active in the nuclear freeze movement found that rather than 
structural isolation, as suggested by collective behaviour 
tradition, the participants displayed link to democratic 
party organizations and the previous anti-Vietnam war 
movement. At least some social movement may become 
institutionalized to the degree that paradigms from areas 
such as political sociology of institution of needed social 
movement may have evolved beyond their earlier collective 
behaviour origins. 
, USA 
96. MILBURN (Michael A), WATANABE (Paul Y) and KRAMER 
(Bernard M) . Nature and source of [US] attitudes toward 
104 
a nuclear freeze. Political Psychology. 7, 4; 1986, Dec; 
661-74, 
Result from a 1984 survey of massachusetts adults 
demonstrate that support for a nuclear freeze is 
consistently high across different political and social 
groups. Uncommonly broad concurrence exists in spite of 
Presidential opposition to the proposal. Analysis of 
respondents' explanations for their opinions about a freeze 
reveals that fear about nuclear war underlies public 
approval of a nuclear freeze. A key factor cited by 
respondents for greater worry about the possibility of 
nuclear war is increased media attention to nuclear issues. 
97. WHITE (Michael J) and FESHBACH (Seymour). Who in middle 
town supports a nuclear freeze? Political Psychology. 8, 
2; 1987, Jun; 201-9. 
Public support for a mutual and verifiable nuclear 
freeze was examined among 251 adult residents of a mid-
western city. During a telephone interview respondents 
answered questions regarding their attitudes toward the 
Soviet Union, national defense, and nuclear disarmament. 
Marginal percentages were similar to those found in national 
surveyes and suggest that supporters and non-supporters of 
nuclear freeze proposal differ on several variables. We 
argue that the conflict between anxieties concerning nuclear 
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warfare and desires for an effective national defense posed 
a significant dilemma for respondent, resulting in 
considerable overlap in positions held by the two groups. 
, VERIFICATION USA 
98. STOERTZ (Howard Jr). Monitoring a nuclear freeze. 
International Security. 8, 4; 1984; 91-110. 
A consideration of the adequacy with which a nuclear 
freeze could be verified indicates that such a freeze would 
sharply constrain US flexibility and could reduce US 
capacity for prompt, counter vailing military response to 
evidence of a violation. To the extent that the freeze loses 
purity and comprehensiveness because of partical 
considerations, it becomes much like any other arms control 
proposal from the point of view of monitoring and verifi-
cation. Definetive judgement about monitoring and 
verification capabilities require detailed analysis of 
classified information. 
, , INDIA-CHINA 
^9. CHENGAPPA (BM). India-China Relations : issues and 
implications. Strategic Analysis. 16, 1; 1993, Apr; 
39-51. 
Military modernization, China's relation with South 
Asian states, the boundary problem and the Chinese nuclear 
explosion in May 1992 coinciding with the Indian President's 
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visit have all had a negative efect on relations with India. 
Only the smooth management of a boundary problem proved to 
be positive. The question is whether Indian diplomacy can 
counter Chinese influence in south-Asia and still continue 
to have cordial relation with China. 
, INDIA-PAKISTAN 
100. CHELLANEY (Brahma). Challenge of Nuclear arms control 
in South Asia. Survival. 35, 3; 1993; 121-36. 
India and Pakistan now openly acknowledge that they 
have nuclear weapon capabilities, although neither admits to 
producing any nuclear bombs. The nuclear programs in India 
and Pakistan are driven by powerful political, military and 
bureaucratic forces that use nationalism as their main 
rechile. Their march towards building nuclear weapons, it is 
conceivable that India and Pakistan may never openly produce 
or deploy nuclear arms, nor nuclearize their missiles. 
Domestic budgetary contraints and civil unrest external 
economic and political pressure could counter-act pro-
nuclear forces. The international community should place 
more emphasis on non-proliferation policies. 
101. KUMAR (A Prasanna). [Indian] nuclear debate. Indian J 
of Pol. Sci. 47, 2; 1986, Apr-Jun; 229-36. 
Although pubic debate dose not precede or greatly 
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influence! a governments nuclear policy, there has been in 
India considerable public debate on India's nuclear dilemma 
to go in for the bomb or not, Pakistan's frantic effort to 
make the bomb and the support she is receiving in this 
regard overtly and covertly from some big powers like the US 
and China seem to have strengthened the plea of the bomb 
lobby that India should make the bomb and avert the looming 
nuclear asymmetry in the sub-continent, yet India should not 
emulate Pakistan in this regard. It requires courage to take 
the decision to make the bomb. Certainly greater courage 
particularly moral, to keep away from the hazardous and 
endless path of nuclear weaponry. 
102. RITCHESON (Philip L). Nuclearization in South Asia. 
Strategic Review. 21, 4; 1993; 39-47. 
Proliferation of weapons of man destruction (nuclear, 
biological and chemical) and the means to deliver them has 
become a primary threat to many nations. In South Asia, 
however proliferation has already taken place. The greater 
problem in this region is nuclearization. Additionally, new 
geopolitical and geostrategic realities, e.g. the remergence 
of central Asia, actually provide greater incentives at a 
minimum, for India and Pakistan to retain their nuclear 
programs, if not actually expand them. 
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1980s 
-; 
103. SUBRAMANIAN (R.R). India Vs. Pakistan : the nuclear 
option. Foreign Affairs reports. 34, 5; 19 85, May; 
59-68. 
In the raid-1980s, the strategic environment of South 
Asia displays a markedly different character from that 
prevailing in the seventies. At that time, largely as a 
result of the Bangladesh war, India's credentials as the 
dominant power is the region had been clearly stabilished. 
Today, the presence of thousands of soviet military troops 
in Afghanistan as well as the upgrading of American naval 
facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian ocean 
raises the probability for super power interventions in the 
region. Furthermore, the proximity of the South Asia region 
to South-West Asia may cause the tensions there to have 
their spillover in to the farmer. Added to this is the 
nuclear factor, one that has assumed some degree of 
importance, in view of the recent success that Pakistan has 
achieved in developing a nuclear weapon capability. 
, INDIAN OCEAN, ASIA SOUTH 
104. RAZVI (Mujtaba). Indian Ocean and South Asian states. 
Journal of Social Science and Humanities. 1, 2; 1986; 
1-5. 
The newly-independent South Asian states, championing 
the cause of disarmament in the decade of 1950s, have now 
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taken up the issue of denuclearization of the Indian ocean 
specifically to save themselves from superpower's rivalry. 
Such efforts would bear fruits only if south asian states 
develop strong and viable power structures and institutions 
of regional cooperation which would eliminate the 
possibilities of superpowers intervention. 
, INF, EUROPE 
105. BUTEUX (Paul). INF negotiations and the prospects for 
nuclear arms control in Europe. International Journal. 
40, 1; 1984-85; 42-67. 
The problems surrounding the search for an INF arms 
control agreement are examined on the eve of the resumption 
of 45 Soviet arms control talks in January 1985. After 
examining the negotiating positions by both parties prior to 
the collapse of the original INF talks in November 1983, the 
prospects for a future agreement are discussed. An analysis 
of the conditions that might make such an agreement possible 
is offered, and the likely form of any agreement it 
assessed. Finally, the article aruges that it will be a 
continuing source of frustration for Europeans that options 
and policies concerning arms control that they consider to 
be fundamental to their security will continue to be 
determined by the state of the Soviet-American political 
relationship. 
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, SECURITY, EUROPE 
106. AUTON (Graeme P). European security and the INF 
dilemma: is there a better way? Arms Control. 5, 1 ; 
1984, May; 3-5 3. 
The NATO intermediate unclear forces decision should 
be seen as part of the perennial effort to sustain the 
validity of traditional Atlanticst concepts. The decsion is 
mistoken, and involves high opportunity costs. By seeking to 
fuse strategic and theater was it ignores legitimate doubts 
about American commitment and fail to consider the grov/ing 
incompatibility between a cataclysmic deterrence posture and 
the desire for a continued US nuclear guarantee. 
, INF-TREATY, USA-USSR 
107. ROGERS (Bernard W) . Arms control and NATO deterrence. 
Global Affairs. 3, 1; 1988; 23-40. 
The double zero intermediate nuclear forces 
agreements will reduce the credibility of NATO's deterrence 
in the eyes of the USSR, thus impacting adversely on Western 
security. The INF agreement will lead to the denucleari-
zational of western Europe, which is what the USSR wants. It 
would make the region safe for Soviet conventional 
aggression or would result in the neutralization of western 
Europe from the threate of the conventional forces of the 
Warsaw pact. Even if the INF accord appears to be in the 
short-term interests of the US, the long term impact could 
be detrimental to the US. 
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, INTERMEDIATE-RANGE, NUCLEAR FORCES, NATO 
108. SHARP (Jane M.O). Understanding the INF debacle : arms 
conbrol and alliance cohesion. Arms Control. 5, 2; 
1984, Sep; 95-127. 
Efforts to negotiate limits on nuclear forces in 
Europe are plagued by a set of recurrent problems. Equitable 
balance are difficult to negotiate when theforces in 
question are asymmetrical. A common bargaining strategy is 
difficult to forge in a hierarchical alliance, like NATO, 
that comprises at least seven different classes of states 
with respect to their nuclear capabilities, nuclear right, 
and nuclear obligations. Finally, bilateral efforts to 
control Soviet and American nuclear forces exacerbate the 
cycle of anxiety among dependent allies caught in the 
classic alliance security dilemma; between the fear of 
abandonment in a crisis and the fear of entrapment in a 
conflict not of one's own choosing. 
, NATO 
109. SABIN (Philip A.G). Should INF and START be merged? A 
historical perspective. International Affairs (London). 
60, 3; 1984; 419-28. 
The problem of whether to pursue arms control 
agreement regarding intercontinental nuclear force and those 
based in Europe independently or in concert is far from nev/. 
Historical experience suggest that the problem is a devil's 
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, SALT, POLICY, USA 
135. DOUGHERTY (James E) . National arms control policy for 
the 1980's. Annals of the Amer. Academy of Pol and So. 
Sc. 457; 1981, Sep; 174-85. 
The SALT decade saw two balances - strategic and 
European - tilt against west. Arms control policy requires 
better integration with US/Allied defense planning needs. It 
must address differences in superpower deterrence doctrines 
and negotiating requirements and NATO dependence on non-NATO 
areas. Policy in each arms control forum should be judged 
according to criteria of western security interests and 
international strategic stability. 
I ' l l 136. KRUZEL (Joseph J). Arms control and American 
defense policy : new alternatives and old realities. 
Daedalus.110, 1; 1981; 137-57. 
An analysis of where the US has been, and where it 
might be headed, in the related fields of arms control and 
defense strategy. The author arrerses the disappointing 
record of SALT, and attributes most of the blame of 
unrealistically high expectation of what strategic arms 
control could produce. The politicization of arms talks (as 
in MBFR) is criticized as is the excessive arms control 
enthusiasm of the Carter Administration. 
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dilemma. With the independent approach to theatre arms 
limitation being hamstrung by strategic asymmetries, while 
composite talks on strategic and medium-range weapons impose 
severe political strains upon the western alliance. An 
attempt that the end of the 1970s to find some middle v/ay 
between these opposing pitfalls failed to provide a 
solution, and no answer is likely to be found without a 
wider agreement on the aims and priorities of arms control 
in general. 
, USA 
110. BURNS (William F) . Arms control in transition : the 
Reagan administration's legacy. Residential Studies 
quarterly. 19, 1; 1989; 31-9. 
The Reagan administration's strong but measured 
position in INF was instrumental in ensuring that, if there 
was a possibility to eliminate the Soviet system, the US 
would certainly exercise that possibility. Another important 
part of its legacy has been the development of consensus in 
the US on a bipartisan basis for arms control. It is likely 
that the bipartisan consensus in the US on arms control will 
continue. The challenge which faces the next administration 
is dealing with necessity of being able to move forward at 
different speeds in different areas. 
, , , , USSR 
111. PICK (Otto). How serious is Gorbachev about arms 
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control. The world today. 43, 4; 1987, Apr; 66-9. 
In his quest for an arms control agreement which 
would pot a break on SDI, Gorbachev has gone out of his way 
to make a number of concessions while still insisting on his 
package at Reykjevik, acceptance of a zero-option on inter-
mediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in the European theatre would 
probably have surprised the Americans, and certainly alarmed 
their allies, but it was immaterial as it was part of his 
overall package. The soviet fixation on SDI and Reagan's 
absolute refusal to negotiate about his initiative has turn 
it into a political symbol. Gorbachev would find it very 
difficult to retreat from his declared position. 
, , LOW SILENCE NUCLEAR - NUCLEAR FREE WORLD 
112. MccGWIRE (Michael). Is there is a future for Nuclear 
weapons? International Affairs. 70, 2; 1984, Apr; 
211-28. 
Another postulates two futures : a low salience 
nuclear (LSN) world and nuclear free world. His comparative 
assessment on the five tasks that continuing v/estern nuclear 
capability and conclude that for only one of the five are 
nuclear weapons essential, and that one would labre in an 
NWF world. Widening the argument to include other require-
ments, risks and opportunities, the explicit goal of an NWF 
world is shown to offer considerably short and long-term 
advantage. Achievable in principle, the major obstacle is a 
mind set shaped by the cold war, which inhibits western 
official down from addressing the question seriously. 
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, MIDDLE-EAST 
113. COHEN (Arner) and MILLER (Marvin). How to think about 
and implement - nuclear arms control in the Middle 
East. Washington Quarterly. 16, 2; 1993; 101-13. 
In the Middle-East both the moderate Arab states and 
Israel now share a common concern about nuclear 
proliferation, and also recognize the need to deal with it 
in a regional basis. Given some progress in the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, a nuclear bargain appears feasible. Israel 
should also provide reassurance that it regards nuclear 
weapons solely as a means of last resort without openly 
acknowledging its nuclear status. 
, MISSILES, DEPLOYMENT, US-USSR 
114. ROSE (William M). Beware of 'counterfeit' unilateral 
[US] initiatives. Arms Control. 7, 1; 1986; 47-58. 
If the US want to deploy more MX missile despite 
strong domestic opposition, it may be tempted to implement a 
"counterfile" unilateral arms control initiative - one 
doomed to fail but which serves a trick to help secure funds 
for the weapon. To help citizens recognize such as abuse of 
the begaining tactic, a predictive framework and 
accompanying histrical evidence are presented. The analysis 
show that conditionally delaying MX deployment, in isolation 
from arms control measures, will not induce the Soviet to 
ban heavy ICMB, because the conditions necessary for 
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successful unilateral initiative can not be met. Therefore 
MX is made part of such a unilateral initative, its probable 
failure would make it a "counterfeit" one. 
, , TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, US-INDIA 
115. SINGH (Ravinder Pal). Effects of missile technology 
control regime and multilateal politics of North-south 
technology transfer. Strategic Analysis. 15, 4; 1992, 
Jul; 229-312. 
This represent the need to control technological 
capabilities being transferred indescriminately for both 
security and commercial reasons. Indian responses to US 
initiatives to deny space-based technologies on the ground 
of their potential diversion to missile programs have to be 
examined in the wider context of Indian security and 
economic interests. Trend indicate that even the major 
players on the world stage are moving towards cooperation. 
They adversarial position based on sensitivities of national 
sovereignty can only violate India. 
, , NEGOTIATIONS, STRATEGY, USA-USSR 
116. BUNN (George) and PAYNE (Rodger A). Titi for tat and the 
negotiation of nuclear arms control. Arms Control. 9, 
3; 1988, Dec; 207-33. 
A bargaining strategy of tit for tat beginning with a 
concession towards the other side, has been urged by 
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theorists of US-Soviet arms control negotiation. This 
article considers the difficulties, both theoretical and 
practical, to carry out such a strategy on the US side. 
Given the participation in arms control negotiations by many 
constituencies - government agencies, congress, US allies 
and the public. For many reasons, the article concludes 
implementing coopertive tit for tat is difficult in arms 
control negotiations. 
, , NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 
117. SHAH (Prakash). Nuclear non-proliferation implications 
and NPT review : an Indian perspective. Strategic 
Analysis. 16, 2; 1993, May; 139-46. 
The goal of NPT is to prevent proliferation of 
nuclear weapons countries, not of weapons. It has failed to 
achieve even that objective. There are today eight nuclear 
weapon countries and many nuclear capable countries. NPT 
allows production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons to five 
countries and does not ban use : India is committed to non-
proliferation but believe NPT will not achieve that 
objective without improvements. India supports international 
commitment and concrete action plans for eliminating nuclear 
arms by an agreed date. Within this overall framework a 
nuclear test ban and breeze on fissile material production 
should be the first priority. 
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, , , INDIA 
118. PRAN CHOPRA. Tov/ards a Nuclear Free World. Econ and Pol 
Weekly. 28, 16; 1993, Apri,i 17; 759-67. 
The nuclear weapons scenario is not as break today as 
it was when India first refused to sign the NPT on the 
ground that it was discriminatory and in the existing from 
world threaten India's security. A number of changes have 
taken place when if built upon constructively can make it 
easier to reconcile non-proliferation and India's security 
concerns and bring nearer the day when the nuclear bomb may 
cease to be an instrument of a national polAcy of any 
country. 
119. ZUBERI (M). Cooperative denuclearization : NPT safe-
guards and India's nuclear strategy. International 
Studies. 30, 2; 1993, Apr-Jun; 151-72. 
The elaborate non-proliferation regime, built around 
the NPT consists of nuclear safeguard, and an expanding web 
of technology controls. It is obvious that the non-proli-
feration regime on NPT is under considerable strain. 
Pakistan had by the end of 1991 enough weapons grade 
enriched uranium for about ten nuclear weapons. If Pakistan 
ever reached the stage of weaponization, India would have to 
rise to the occasion. A dialogue with US, India must warm 
them to this possibility, thereby emergizing US diplomacy 
into restraining Pakistan. 
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, INDIA-PAKISTAN 
120. HAGERTY (Devin T). Power of Suggestion : Opaque proli-
feration, existential deterrence and the south Asian 
nuclear arms competition. Security Studies. 2, 3-4; 
1993; 256-83. 
Contrary to the mainstream "Logic of non prolifera-
tion" which holds that the spread of nuclear weapons to 
conflict prone regions enhances the threat of nuclear war, 
another variant holds that the spread of nuclear weapons may 
contribute to international security rather than threaten 
it. India and Pakistan have been in a state of perpetual 
transition to nuclear weapons status since at least 1974. 
The opaque proliferation approach recognies this transition 
period not as an outcome but as a continuing process of 
regional proliferation. 
121. KHILNANI (Niranjan M)• Denuclearization of South Asia. 
The Round Table. 299; 1986, Jul; 280-86. 
Only India and all other things being equal, Pakistan 
make a virtue of their nuclear ambivalence, a highly 
deplorable policy. India's nuclear option can be perceived 
as a symbol of protest against the discriminatory policy of 
the nuclear weapon states, and a factor which can be used to 
put pressure on those states with nuclear weapon to get them 
to accept genuine nuclear disarmament. India and Pakistan 
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should neither give up their nuclear option, nor sign the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), until the nuclear 
weapons states implement article VI of the NPT. If Pakistan 
should decide to go nuclear, no Indian government will be 
able to withstand the political pressures to follow suit. 
, INDIA-US 
122. DATT (Savita), US and Indian Non-proliferation objec-
tives and concerns. Indian Defence Review. 9, 3; 1994, 
Jul; 15-9. 
It takes a look at the US non-proliferation objecti-
ves and Indian concerns regarding comprehensive global 
nuclear disarmament. Although the difference in Indo-US 
approaches to nuclear question become evident in 1968 itself 
when the NPT was signed. There is something in the non-
proliferation approach i.e. common to comprehensive nuclear 
disarmament and similarly the road that would have to go 
through the non-proliferation way. It highlights the common 
grounds where both can meet and explore if there is any scope 
for accomodation where no common ground exist. The US non-
proliferation objectives in the post cold war context at the 
global level, have been quite succinctly outlined in white 
house facet sheet on Non-proliferation and Export control 
policy. 
, POST COLD-WAR 
123. SIMPSON (John). Nuclear non-proliferation in post-cold 
120 
war era. International Affairs. 70, 1; 1994, Jan; 17-36. 
Major changes in the International situation since 
the signing of the treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
weapons (NPT) in 1968, and even since the last quinquennial 
review conference on the treaty in 1990, makes the next such 
conference in 1995 an occasion of particular interest. In 
addition this conference must decide on the future duration 
of the treaty. Author examines the development of NPT context 
and concludes that its slow evolution over the year after 
1968 has given way to a succession of revolutionary rather 
than evolutionary changes during the past three years. New 
proliferation risks and new challenges to international 
concerns underpinuing the non-proliferation regime, are 
identified and discussed. 
, , , role of USA 
124. SMITH (Gerard C) and COBBAN (Helena). Bind eye to 
nuclear proliferation. Freign Affairs. 68, 3; 1989; 
53-70. 
As a relationship between the two superpowers becomes 
more stable, the US should rearsess its role in the global 
effort against nuclear proliferation. In past years, the US 
adopted a frequently permissive attitude towards two nuclear 
"maverick" states in particular - Israel and Pakistan, 
subordinating the goal of preventing nuclear weapons proli-
feration to other foreign policy goals. This allowed Israel 
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and Pakistan to reach or cross the threshold of nuclear 
weapons possession. The Bush administration should now 
attempt to freeze and reduce theser two states nuclear 
stockpiles, while also working to reduce the security threat 
these states perceive, 
, , NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES and IAEA 
125. DATT (Savita). NPT and the non-nuclear weapons states : 
Options and non-options. Strategic Analysis. 15, 10; 
1993, Jan; 911-23. 
Even if India or most of non-nuclear weapons states 
(NNWS) were to wake up to the opportunity and exercise it to 
effect a mass exodus from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is 
not certain that the nuclear weapon states (NWS) would accept 
a treaty on comprehensive nuclear disarmament. They know that 
it is not the NPT which has kept the countries from going 
nuclear. They also know that a world without NPT would not 
become totally nuclear. The IAEA safeguards would continue 
despite the NPT and rules related to materials supplied by 
supplier nations would continue to operate. What would be 
exposed would be the intentions of the NWS. 
, , POLICY, INDIA 
126. WITTIG (Gerhard). Dimensions of soviet-arms control 
policy. Comparative Strategy. 7, 1; 1988; 1-15. 
This article discusses Moscow's fundamental attitude 
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toward international security. The perceived need for 
"reliable defence" and the result and rejection of nuclear 
deterrence. On this basis, different way of translating the 
Soviet security interest into arms diplomacy are analyzed. 
The Kremlin's efforts to conclude an intermediate range 
nuclear force (INF) agreement with the US in 1987 must be 
understood as a natural outgrowth of policies that has 
developed over a long time [R]. 
, INDIA 
127. PARANJPE (Shrikant). India's nuclear status : a policy 
note. Asiaji Affairs, 13, 2; 1986: 56-60. 
India began its nuclear energy programme immediately 
after its independence in 1947. Shifts in the peace policy 
began in response to Chinese postures of the mid-1960s and 
finally culminated in the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion 
[PNE]. In the late 1970s, Indian nuclear policy came to be 
restated as a peace policy with a deterrent capability. In 
the 1980s, Pakistan's emergence as a nuclear capable power 
has once again opened the nuclear debate in India. While 
Pakistan is likely to follow a policy of building nuclear 
capability it is unlikely to go in for weapon production or 
even a demonstration of capability (PNE). Given such a 
likelihood, the pressure on India not to shift its present 
stand v/ould keep India on the peaceful use ine in nuclear 
matters. 
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, UK-USA, 1980's 
128. CROFT (Stuart). Britain and the nuclear arms control 
process in the 1980s. Arms Control. 9, 3; 1988, Dec; 
265-79. 
The nuclear arms control policy of the UK is strongly 
influenced by Britain's special relationship with the US. 
This article questions how valid the special relationship 
has been in the 1980s. It examines the three goals of 
British strategy in this field, and the four tactical consi-
derations used in evaluating other nations, arms control 
policies in relation to nuclear arms control, there has been 
a break down during the 1980s. In the consensus between 
London and Washington, this is one reason for British 
attempts to improve relation with Mascow. The danger is one 
of the UK becoming isolated over its attitude to nuclear 
arms control policy within NATO. However, pragmatism is a 
key aspect of the British approach, within certain defined 
parameters. 
, USA 
129, JOHANSEN (Robert C) . Future of arms control. World 
Policy Journal. 2, 2; 1985; 193-227. 
The Reagan administration's security policy has been 
marked by its belief in the nearly universal utility of 
military power and its quest for superiority. Hence, it has 
committed itself to a strategic warfighting doctrine and the 
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development of a wide array of ever more threatening 
weapons, advocated one-sided proposals for arms control, and 
only halfheartedly supported existing treaties. To reduce 
the threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity a new code 
of international conduct must elevate the goal of war 
prevention above the struggle for geopolitical advantages. 
, , , USSR 
130. PICK (0tt6).Practice and theory in Soviet arms control 
policy. The World.Today. 38, 7-8; 1982, Jul-Aug; 257-63, 
Analyses the discrepancies between Soviet declaratory 
policy with regard to disarmament and some of the statements 
of military theories on nuclear war-fighting capacities. It 
relates Soviet arms control policy to the general doctrine 
of the correlation of forces and tries to show that the 
present insistence by Moscow in maintaining the nuclear 
status quo falls reasonably within the scope of that 
doctrine. It is argued that, compared to the ineptitude of 
US policy, the Soviet Union has achieved a psychological 
advantage which may serve its purpose in any East-West 
negotiations. 
, , PROSPECTS, view point 
131. RAJAGOPALAN (Rajesh). Future of arms control : Whats in 
it for use? Strategic Analysis. 12, 3; 1988, Jun; 
319-29. 
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The primary nuclear threat faced by non-nuclear 
states cannot be removed by half way measures like nuclear 
arms control. It can only be met by comprehensive nuclear 
disarmament. It is in this perspective that the INF 
agreement and the START negotiations for a 95% nuclear arms 
reduction should be viewed. While these agreement are 
appreciable as steps leading to eventual complete nuclear 
disarmament. In the absence of further agreement their 
usefulness in meeting the threat of nuclear weapons to the 
developing world is questionable. 
, REDUCTION, VERIFICATION 
132. LORD (Carnes). Verification : reforming a theology. The 
national interests. 3; 1986; 50-60. 
Verification is becoming increasingly difficult in a 
technical sense as the relevant weaponry becomes smaller, 
more mobile and less distinctive. US intelligence assets 
that are critical for verification have been lost or 
compromised by espionage over the last decade. The extent 
effectiveness of Soviet concealment and deception efforts 
are growing. Yet the crisis in verification poicy is more 
than the sum of these development. It is at bottom an 
intellectual crisis, reflecting the persistence of habits of 
thought that are increasingly inadequate to deal with 
present realities. The time has come to rethink the 
verification problem. 
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, role of GATT 
133. REISS (Mitchell). Learning from GATT : lessons for arms 
control. Arms Control. 21, 1; 1983, May; 40-8. 
A new, more flexible methodof negotiations arms 
control agreements is needed, one which will be consistent 
with the American Political tradition of congressional 
involvement in foreign affairs and the common interests of 
both superpowers. Restructuring the arms control process 
along the lines of general agreement on Tariffs and trade 
offers the best opportunity to achieve a reduction in the 
nuclear inventories of the US and the USSR. 
, , , POLITICS 
134. GOLDMAN (Emity O) . Arms control : the contribution of 
politics by other means. Diplomacy and Statecraft. 4, 
2; 1983, Jul; 258-84. 
With the burgeoning of nuclear arrenals after World 
War II, arms control become tighty linked to the cold war 
political landscape characterised by bipolarity, irreconci-
lable political differences, an overriding concern with 
nuclear technology, and an obsersion with the military 
dimensions of security. Arms control was relegated to a 
technical exercise of fine tunning force structures and 
military balances. Political based strategies offer far more 
promise for the future. 
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, VERIFICATION 
137. BELLANY (Ian). Analogy for arms control. International 
Security. 6, 3; 1981-82; 177-81. 
On the presumption that everything is like something 
else bilateral arms control (e.g. the so-called "SALT" 
negotiations) is compared to duopolistic marketing 
arrangement between a pair of large rival business concerns 
who have settled for "orderly marketing" instead of 
competition. The analogy suggests that bi-lateral arms 
control will exhibit certain feature (e.g. quantitative arms 
control taking precedence over qualitative, great attention 
given to verification procedures, an inherent instability) 
which appear to correspond closely to the facts as observed. 
, SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, VERIFICATIONS 
138. THOMAS (Valerie). Verification of limits on long range 
nuclear SLCMs. Science and Global Security. 1, 1-2; 
1989; 27-57. 
Arms control negotiators have identified a number of 
problems in verifying limits on long range nuclear sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). This would include 
monitoring of the production and maintenance of any non-
nuclear long-range SLCMs and any nuclear long-range SLCMs 
not banned by the agreement. Tagging of these missiles to 
allow identification at subsequent inspection at shore based 
maintenance depots would significantly decrease the 
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probability that undetected SLCMs could be deployed or that 
non-nuclear SLCMs might be covertly converted to nuclear. 
, SEA, USA-USSR 
139. MOORTH (P). Nuclear arms and arms control at sea. 
Strategic Analysis. 12, 1; 1988, Jul; 431-45. 
Naval nuclear arms control deserves special attention 
because of the increasing number of nuclear weapons widely 
dispersed by the US, the USSR, the UK, France and China at 
sea. Sea-based nuclear weapons serve two important purposes: 
for ocean nuclear combat and for striking land targets from 
the sea. The naval nuclear weapons developed for war 
fighting at sea, like anti-ship, anti-aircraft and anti-
submarine nuclear weapons, should be considered in their 
negotiations. Both the US and the USSR should limit their 
areas of operation at sea, and this restriction should be 
followed by their promise to stop the spread of the nuclear 
arms race and eliminate their naval infrastructure at sea. 
, SOUTH ASIA 
140. SCHANDLER (Harber Y). Arms control in South Asia. 
Washington Quarterly. 10, 1; 1987; 69-79. 
Soviet nuclear deployments in the East have caused 
growing concern in China, Japan and South Korea. These 
Soviet deployment underscore the unique security role of the 
US in the far east. To the extent that the US continues to 
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take global approach to INF negotiations. It will ineffect 
be negotiating for Japan and China as well. In order to make 
the negotiations successful, However, the US must 
demonstrate that it has a cradible counter to the SS-20. As 
part of its over all improving defense posture in the far 
east. The US must strengthen its military capability and 
alliance v/hile at the same time sustaining efforts to 
negotiate a frame work for cohexistance with Moscow. 
Although the Soviet missiles in the far east complicate 
negotiations in Geneva with the USSR on INF limitations. 
These missiles also provided an opportunity for the US to 
underline its role as the solve strategic counter weight to 
Soviet power in the area. 
, SPACE 
141. BUNDY (McGeorge et al). President's choice : star wars 
or arms control. Foreign Affairs. 63, 2; 1984-85; 
264-78. 
The reelection of Reagan makes the future of his 
strategic defence initiative the most important question of 
nuclear arms competition and arms control on the national 
agenda since 1972. What is centrally and fundamentally wrong 
with the Presidents objective is that it can not be 
achieved. The program offers no prospect for a leak-proof 
defence against strategic ballistic missiles and it entirely 
excludes from its range any effort to limit the 
effectiveness of other systems. 
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, START and INTERMEDIATE RANGE FORCE 
142. THOMSON (James A). After two tracks : integrating START 
and INF. Washington quarterly. 7, 2; 1984; 17-28. 
Growing interest in comprehensive arms control has 
engendered increasing momentum for the proposal to integrate 
the START and INF negotiations. The author examines the 
premise that comprehensive arms control talks would be more 
effective, and considers whether the obstacles to 
integration currently blocking progress can be more easily 
solved in an integrated framework. 
, , USA, HISTORY 
143. KRUZEL (Joseph). From Rush-Bagot to START : the lessons 
of arms control. Orbis. 30, 1; 1986; 193-216. 
No element of American foreign policy is more 
contentious than arms control, yet little attention is paid 
to the historical record which may yield instructive lessons 
about arms control. Based on an analysis arms control 
negotiations and agreements over a period of 150 years. 
Several propositions are advanced. For example, negotiations 
are more likely to succeed when military technology is seen 
to be relatively stable and developing slowly. Politically, 
arms control negotiations have proven to be a poor way for 
hostile nation to brack the diplomatic ice over time 
military services have exerted increasing influence over 
arms control policy. Theunderstanding of arms control - its 
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possibilities and limitations can be improved by the study 
of earlier negotiations and accords. 
, 1980's 
144. NYE (Joseph, S.J.), Farewell to arms control. Foreign 
Affairs. 65, 1; 1986; 1-20. 
In the early 1980s, President Reagan proposed 
induction in strategic arms (the START talk) and space based 
defense program (the strategic defense initiative) in 
response to increased public agitation over nuclear arms and 
decaying Soviet American relation due, in part, to non-
retification of SALT-II. Numerous critics, bothwith in the 
administration and without questioned the value of 
negotiation deep reductions. Careful analysis of effect of 
such reductions reveal several positive political impact as 
well as several uncertain or potentially damaged strategic 
consequences. More valuable then simple reductions in the 
number of war heads, however, would be measure which 
increases reliance on nuclear weapons. If Reagan does not 
overcome largely self-created obstacles to achieving such 
measures, future administration will face the dilemma of 
deterrence in an even more turbulent political environment. 
, , , USA-USSR 
145. SLOCOMBE (Walter B). Force Posture Consequences of the 
START treaty. Survival. 30, 5; 1988, Sep-Oct; 402-8. 
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The US arms control agenda for thenear future will be 
dominated by the effort to realize a strategic arms 
reduction treaty (START). The main element of such an 
agreement is a major reduction in offensive strategic 
weapons. In addition, such a agreement would set up a system 
of counting rules for attributing "Points" to deployed 
systems, establish a limit on the number of nuclear point 
each side would be permitted to have in its overall 
strategic force and require forms of co-operation by the 
USSR to determine the "point structure" of the Soviet force. 
The prospective agreement could produce large overall cuts, 
reinforce the infeasibility of first strike, and prevent 
increases in current force levels. 
, , TEST BAN, TREATY 
146. ZIMTIERMAN (Peter D). QuQta testing. Foreign Policy. 44; 
1981; 82-93. 
A comprehensive test ban treaty would be a 
significant sktep in slowing themomentum of the arms race. 
However, a true comprehensive test ban treaty could have an 
adverse effect on how Americans assess the security of their 
country. A lost of confidence in the reliability of 
the nuclear stockpile would inevitably occur without 
testing. Theproblem is that the complete absense of such a 
treaty could undermine the effort to control nuclear 
proliferation. 
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, TESTS, USSR 
147. FERM (Ragnhild). Nuclear explosions. SIPRI Yearbook. 
1990; 51-7. 
27 nuclear explosions were conducted in 1989, fewer 
than the yearly average for the past 28 years. This was 
because the US and the USSR carried out fewer tests than in 
previous years. For the first time in many year no so-
called peaceful nuclear explosion was conducted. Protests 
against nuclear testing for environmental as well as for 
disarmament reasons increased. Demonstrations at the Soviet 
test site at semipalatinsk were reported by Soviet mass 
media. The Kazakhustan government requested the authorities 
to close the test site aus stop the teesting programme. 
148. GUNTER (Michael M) . Gone proposal ; a passage through 
the impasses of nuclear arms control? Arms Control. 4, 
3; 1983, Dec; 236-49. 
The Gore proposal for nuclear arms control envisages 
a 12 year period divided in to two phases : the deployment 
of the last of the MIRVs, and the shift away from MIRUS to 
single-v/arhead missiles. This plan is designed to gradually 
shift the forces of both sides to dramatically lower levels, 
with mixes of weapons on each side that are mutually stable. 
The Gore proposal would have a self-regulating a implemen-
ting characteristic in that each side would have an interest 
in maintating a stable nuclear relationship. 
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, , , 1953 
149. SOKOLSKI (Henry). Arms for peace : a non-proliferation 
primer? Arms control. 1, 2; 1980, Sept; 199-231. 
President Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for peace programme 
tried to link the control of horizontal proliferation with 
that of vertical proliferation. The difficulty was that how 
these problems might be related, and even what they were, 
did not get enough study. Most generally, the two things 
most responsible for Atoms for peace's failings v;ere its 
being mistaken aboutthe precise character of the threats it 
was designed to limit and its premature fatalism. 
, USA-USSR 
150. WARNER (Edward L. Ill) and OCHMANEK (David) Arms 
Control. American Defense Annual. 1987-88; 201-21. 
In 1986 there appeared realistic propsect for a halt 
and reversal in the growth of the nuclear arsenals of the US 
and the USSR for the first time since the beginning of the 
nuclear age. The agreement reach at the Stockholm conference 
in September represented a limited but useful step toward 
regulating the activities of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. At 
Reykjavik, in October. The US and USSR worked out the basic 
elements of a series of potential agreements that had eluded 
them for years. By the end of 1986 it was clear that the 
year had been a very active and potentially significant one 
for arm control. 
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, , , 1980's 
151, BOREN (David), GARN (Jake) and KUPPERMAN (Robert H) . 
Arms control in the 1980's, Washington Quarterly. 6, 1; 
1983; 19-27. 
The US must develop military and political programs 
of the latest type in consonance with firm, clear armaments 
negotiated with the USSR aimed at major reductions in the 
number and power of nuclear weapons, at the achievement of 
nuclear quality at lower numerical and destructive levels, 
and at lessening the risk of the utilization of nuclear 
weapons in war. These modernized forces must be integrated 
for maximum efficiency. 
, USSR-USA 
152. BROWN (Harold) and DAVIS (Lynn E) . Nuclear Arms 
Control: where do we stand? Foreign Affairs. 62, 5 ; 
1984; 1145-60. 
Arms control agreement can be designed to help the US 
ensure that its nuclear forces are sufficiently capable and 
survivable to provide for deterrence through the threat of 
effective retaliation. Arms control, thereby contributes 
indirectly to the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of 
nuclear war. US objectives in a future nuclear arms control 
agreement with the USSR should be to constrain the overall 
build up of nuclear weapon and to establish overall equality 
under a broad set of measures. 
137 
, USSR VIEVJPOINT 
153. RIVKIN (David B). Soviet approach to nuclear arms 
control: Continuity and change. Survival. 29, 6; 1987, 
Nov-Dec; 483-510. 
As the result of both substantive and procedural 
changes in Soviet arms control diplomacy under M. Gorachev, 
western observers have speculated that the fundamental 
change in Soviet arm control is taking place such a 
judgement may be premature. The USSR seems prepared to 
consider a range of arms control regimes, including heavy 
reduction in nuclear forces, that reviously would have not 
been acceptable. But the USSR has always treated arms 
control in a comprehensive fashion, within the overall 
context of Soviet and foreign policy; So it is not 
surprising that Soviet positions have altered. 
154. ROSTOW (Eugene Y). Why the Soviets want an arms control 
agreement, and why they want it now. Commentary. 83, 2; 
1987, Feb; 19-26. 
The USSR has long believed that the most pov;erful 
modern weapon in its arsenal would be a clear-cut Soviet 
first strike nuclear capacity. It altogether correct in 
believing that an unequivocal Soviet first strike capability 
would split and paralyze the West, inhibiting the 
possibility of any Western response, conventional or 
nuclear, to the indefinite expension of Soviet power. No 
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western government wants to test the arcane calculations of 
the nuclear first strike exercise impractice. Even though a 
deliberate nuclear war among the nuclear powers is the least 
likely scenario, the state of the nuclear balance is a 
critical and in many circumstances a decisive factor in 
determining the ability to use or threaten to use 
conventional force. 
155. SEN GUPTA (Bhabani). Soviet position on nuclear arms 
control and limitations. Strategic Analysis. 9, 12; 
1986,. Mar; 1282-1300. 
In nuclear arms, or atleast strategic nuclear arms 
the USSR continues to be the defensive, revisionist super 
power : its goal is to deny the US strategic superiority, 
and it has by and large achieved that goal. Soviet nuclear 
arms policy have been generally reactive to US achievement 
and doctrines. Unlike the US, Soviet nuclear arm control and 
limitation policies have not been buffeted domestic 
political consideration. Like Soviet foreign policy itself, 
nuclear arms control and strategic limitations have enjoyed 
a remarkable continuity. After Gorbachev, the USSR v/ill 
device fresh initiative to reduce Europeans to work out the 
European system of security. It will press the US for a 
unilateral inf not a joint declaration of no first use of 
nuclear weapons and for a freeze on nuclear arms production. 
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, VERIFICATION 
156. JACKSON (William D) . Verification in arms control : 
Beyond NTM. Jl of Peace Research. 19, 4; 1982; 345-53. 
Judgement about the vertification risks entailed in 
participation in an arms control argreement are made within 
the framework of Cold„ War anxieties and influenced by 
political and bureaucratic considerations. In approaching 
the strategic and theater nuclear arms control agenda of the 
1980's, it will be necessary to device verification regimes 
which not only provide reliable security guarantees against 
strategic breakout, but which also promote confidence among 
arms control policy influential groups and strengthen 
coalitions in favour of participation in the agreements. 
, INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION 
157. IMAY (Ryukichi). Diplomacy of compliance and modern 
arms control : problems of third party participation. 
International Affairs. 62, 1; 1985; 87-94. 
Repeated refusal to admit international inspectors 
even on reasons of nuclear safety, would lead to serious 
suspicion about the potential diversion of nuclear material. 
There are, in fact, example of countries deliberately 
playing on the politics of non-compliance. If such is the 
reality of compliance dipomacy today with the national 
security of the superpowers at stake, the rest of the world 
must show remarkable determination to cultivate the means of 
active participation. 
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, , , USA 
158, KRASS (Allan S). Verification and trust in arms 
control. Journal of Peace Research. 22, 4; 1985; 285-88. 
In the US even liberal advocates of arms control take 
as their basic premise that the USSR can not be trusted to 
comply with the term of treaties. On the other hand, the 
tendency of the USSR to seen in every US proposal for 
increased transparency a sinister effort at espionage is 
evidence for a high level of distrust. In fact there is no 
necessary reason to assume that states v;hich maintain a 
tight control over information and political expression are 
less trustworthy than pluralistic states in complying with 
arms control agreements. 
, USA-USSR 
159. PIERAGOSTINI (Karl). Arms control verification : 
cooperating reduce uncertainly. Journal of Conflict 
resolution. 30, 3; 1986, Sep; 420-44. 
The arms control experience of the past 25 years has 
shown varification to be the key of the future success of 
formal arm control agreements, and has highlighted hov/ 
crucial cooperation is to the verification effort. 
Unfortunately, fundamental disagreement persists within the 
US over what we should expect from verification, and we 
seems to have lost sight of how far we have come with the 
USSR. The first half of this article outlines the question 
involved in the debate over verification how much of it is 
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enough, and what v/e should do about suspected cheating. 
These include measures to foster resolution of treaty 
related problems, increase the effectiveness of national 
technical means, and allow the use of "Black box" sensor. 
These precedent represent considerable progress of which we 
should remind ourself, especially at the time when they may 
be replaced in jeopardy by our more recent lack of success 
in arm control. 
, , WAR, PREVENTION 
160. NYE (Joseph S^.Jr.). Arms control and prevention of v/ar. 
The VJashington Quarterly. 7, 4; 1984; 59-70. 
Many of the measures for reducing the risk of nuclear 
war do not require negotiation with the USSR. They are 
susceptible to policy responses which are domestic and 
unilateral. It v/ould be a mistake to ignore even modest 
improvements in lov/ering nuclear risks. But it would be a 
mistake to constrain a strategy for nuclear risk reduction 
to measures that deal with the least likely paths or only 
the precipitating rather than deeper causes. 
161. REYNOLDS (Harry L) . New directions for arms control. 
Washington Quarterly. 5, 4; 1982; 151-7. 
Highlights that the main goal of arms control is to 
reduce the probability of nuclear war. Current arms control 
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efforts, with few exceptions, are almost entirely devoted to 
trying to achieve relatively minor reductions in force 
levels. The probability of nuclear war is influenced by many 
factors. Perhaps the most important are the potential 
outcome of surprise attacks, threats to strategic force 
survivability, and required rapid response times which can 
lead to mistakes or miscalculations. It is suggested that 
long term arms control policy and objectives be directed 
towards the control and elimination of short time delivery 
system. 
, PEACE MOVEMENTS in relation to MARXISM-LENINISM 
162. YOUNG (Elisabeth) and YOUNG (Wayland). Marxism-Leninism 
and arms control Arms Control. 1, 1; 1980, May; 2-29. 
It is to the nature of today's Marxist-Leninism and 
to the USSR's Marxism-Leninist peace program that the v/est 
and the world must look if it is to succeed in persuading 
the USSR to reduce its armaments. Maxism-Leninism is the 
criterion for the administration of justice and the logic of 
the arms build-up in the USSR; it underpins the relations 
with allies and with the various capitalist and other 
foreign countries and governments. The west has not 
sufficiently taken account of this factor. 
, POLICIES, BUSH compared with CARTER 
163. LAGON (Mark P) and FINEL (Bernard I). Logic of American 
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arms control dogma : lessons from Carter and Bush 
Experiences. World Affairs. 154, 2; 1991; 56-98. 
A comparison of Carter administration's pursuit of 
SALT II and the Bush administration's strategic arms control 
policy immediately after the cold war reveals flov/s in the 
premises behind the advocacy of arms control. There are four 
basic reasons v/hy arms control had so little utility : (1) 
arms control did not address the real sources of insecurity 
in the world; (2) it was based on the false notion that more 
arms necessarily made war more likely; (3) it did not 
increase cooperation, but merely provided another area of 
conflict; (4) It ensure the confrontation would continue by 
feezing in place an unstable status quo. 
, ROMANIA 
164. MASON (David S). Romanian autonomy and arms control 
policies. Arms Control. 3, 1; 1982, May; 13-36. 
Romania has pursued a maverick policy on arms 
control, as a means to blester its autonomy and reduce its 
dependence on the USSR, Romania has been East-Europe's most 
outspoken critic of the arms race, and assigns equal blame 
to the superpov/er for their inability to moderate the race. 
Romania leaders have proposed numerous, detailed, and far-
reaching plans for military disengagement in Europe. These 
often differ substantially from soviet or Warsaw pact 
positions. These policies are a means toward achieving 
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Romania's viev? of a desirable world order which includes a 
greater role for smaller states, a decreased use of force in 
relations among states, and a reduction in the importance of 
the military blocs. 
, POLICY, BALANCE OF POWER 
165. EKSTEROWICZ (Anthony J). Balance of power foundation 
for contemporary arms control praxis. Journal of 
Social, Political and Economic Studies. 13, 3; 1988; 
315-32. 
The balance of power approach to world order provides 
a foundation for contemporary arms control praxis. This 
approach accomodates two diverse images of international 
reality and two contending foreign policy elite belief 
system. Both of these images and belief systems possess 
implications for contemporary arms control efforts. The 
traditional image of international reality along with a 
"cold war internationalist" foreign policy belief system 
shaped the Reagan administrations views on arms control. 
There were, however, deep arms control division within that 
administration which resulted in an arms control policy 
stalemate. Attention to the sources of this stalemate, 
particularly in the appointment process, could aid future 
presidential administrations in the successful pursuit arms 
control policies. 
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, SALT-I and II, NEGOTIATIONS USA 
166. SCHNEIDER (William Jr), Road to Geneva. Strategic 
review. 13, 4; 1985; 25-31. 
The firmness of the Reagan administration's arms 
control policy in the face of the Soviet propaganda 
offensive and domestic pressures generated by it - already 
has been rewarded by a soviet counterproposal that, although 
it hold out sweeping inequalities, for the first time pays 
soviet deference to the principle of deep reductions in the 
nuclear inventories of both sides. The administrations 
crafted its negotiations policy with a clear understanding 
of the mistakes and failure that marked the road of SALT I 
and SALT II - failures attributable as much to American 
myopia as to soviet exploitation and breaches of agreements. 
The newly charted road to Geneva is based on the principle 
of reductions, equality and veritable compliance and on 
recognition of the essentiality of objective liverage to an 
equitable and constructive bargaining process. 
, USA 
167. BRZENISKI (Zbigniew). National [US] strategy and arms 
control. Washington Quarterly. 10, 1; 1987; 5-11. 
The geopolitical and ideological conflicts between 
the US and USSR are the main cause of hostility and tension. 
Competition in arms, both strategic and conventional is the 
consequence of that condition not its cause. Any arms 
control agreement has to evolve on site verification if it 
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will contribute to a genuine mutual stability. If the Soviet 
response or on going Soviet programs proliferate Soviet 
strategic system, US additional deployment will have to be 
quite substantial at the same time, It would not be 
destabilizing international if SDI were linked to self 
imposed restraint on the US side on the number and 
character of further US strategic offensive deployments. 
, USSR 
168. HEDLIN (Myron). Moscow's line on arms control. Problems 
of Communism. 33, 3; 1984, May-June; 19-36. 
Arms control remains a central concern of soviet 
foreign policy, despite the recent changes in Kremlin 
leadership and deterioration in East-West relations. The 
sustained but ultimately fertile Soviet effort to prevent 
deployment of nev/ NATO missiles in Europe has made it even 
more difficult to reach new strategic or conventional arms 
agreement leaving a legacy of complication and statement 
with the Chlervenko-led Politkuro must now contard. 
, VERIFICATION INTELLIGENCE, USA-USSR 
169. SHULSKY (Abram N. ) Intelligence ard arms control 
policy. Teaching political Science. 16, 2; 1989; 47-54. 
Although intelligence has a significant role to play 
with respect to every aspect of arms control policy, it seems 
particularly important with respect to verification, and its 
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ffol® is often controversial. Typically verification is 
on considered to have three functions; detecting 
violations, deterring violations and increasing confidence 
in parties compliance with existing arms contorl agreements. 
Of these three functions, the first is fundamental. The 
other two functions serve, as it were, cause of arms control 
itself; they maintain the viability of a national security 
policy option which otherwise v/ould not exist, or would nto 
be desirable. A wider task of intellengence in arms control 
for the US is the divining, and advising on v/ays of 
influencing, basic Soviet intention in the strategic and 
political realms. 
, PROBLEMS 
170. KRELL (Gert). Problems and achievments of arms 
control.Arms Control. 2, 3; 1981, Dec; 247-83. 
Arms control is not a logically consistent concept, 
its various goals can not be achieved simultaneously and 
with equal effect. Arms control theory has encouraged its 
own critique v/hich again is essentially apolitical. In spite 
of continuous innovation in weapons technology, arms control 
is not basically a technical problem. Asymmetries in force 
posture and doctrine between East and West will prevent neat 
solutions to theoretical problems of stability. 
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, PROLIFERATION, BALLISTIC-MISSILE, MIDDLE-EAST 
171. NAVIAS (Marrlins), Ballistic missile proliferation in 
the Middle east. Survival. 3, 3; 1989, May-June; 
225-39. 
While ballistic missile proliferation adds a 
si9nificant element to regional tention and instability it 
is, after all, but one consequence of that regional 
insecurity and not a prime cause of it. Unpalatable as it 
may just appear, given the general level of instability in 
the middle east, serious arms control-whether of a ballistic 
missile, chemical or nucler variety may v/ell have to follow 
political settlements of the various disputes or be included 
in them. To conclude otherv/ise may be both overly 
optimistic, and only serve further to divert attention away 
from addressing the deeper political frictions that 
characterize the region. 
, PROPAGANDA, UK, 1980's 
172. SABIN (Philip A.G.) Proposals and propaganda: arms 
control and British public opinion in the 1980s. 
Internationa] Affairs. 63, 1986-87; 49-63. 
Public oinion is not reflected adequately in opinion 
results alone; one must also consider the levels of 
knowledge, concern and consistency under lying the opinions 
expressed. Arms control does not seem to make as much 
difference to public anxiety about war as do other 
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developments such as new nuclear deployments or the level of 
political tension. Garbachev's "peace offensive" is falling 
flat because it is defusing the anxiety promoting British 
protests against nuclear weapons, faster than it wins 
coverts. The British governments should not be panicked into 
an unsincere propaganda contest of radical disarmament 
initiatives, but should stress the stabilizing benefits of 
more limited measures of arms control. 
, REDUCTIONS, EUROPE 
173. FLANAGAN (Stephen J) and HAMILTON (Andrew). Arms 
control and stability in Europe : reductions are not 
enough. Survival. 30, 5; 1988, Sept-Oct; 448-63. 
Developments of a coherent arms control strategy has 
become an essential elements of Western efforts to stabilize 
the military competition and ameliorate the political 
climate. Although Allied governments agree on the general 
thrust of new conventional arms control initiatives, 
important differences remain on the long term objectives of 
western arms-control policy. There remains a fundamental 
divergence of Eastern and Western viev/s concerning the state 
of the conventional balance in Europe, as well as the types 
of force reductions or restructuring and associated measures 
that would best enhance stability. 
, HISTORY 
174. FAIRBANKS (Charles H. Jr). and SHULSKY (Abram N). From 
150 
"arms control" to arms reductions : the historical 
experience. Washington quarterly. 10, 3; 1987, 59-73. 
A decision to reduce levels of certain arms does not 
just reduce those levels, but sets in motion a series of 
changes involving other v;eapon systems, the organizations 
that run them, and the doctrine according to v;hich they 
would be employed. Very low levels of arms are indirectly 
cause unnecessary tension if the political situation change 
and one country reacts by a rearmament program which change 
the relative strengths of the parties in a very rapid 
manner. The question of the appropriate level of armament is 
much more complicated than is suggested by the view v/hich 
sees the primary purpose of arms control as that of breaking 
the momentum of the arms race. 
, role of CANADA 
175. REFORD (Robert W) . Our seat at the table : a Canadian 
menu for arms control. International Journal. 36, 3; 
1981; 657-77. 
This article discussed aspects of arms control where 
Canada has the greatest potential influence because of 
special experience of expertise. Four are selected for 
detailed analysis : (1) Arctic, and the possibility of a 
nuclear war-fare and free zone and a zone of peace are 
discussed. (2) Anti-submarine warfare and the concept of 
sanctuaries for sub-marines is proposed. (3) Comprehensive 
bar on nuclear tests, where Canadian reisomologists have 
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solved technical problems of verification. (4) Chemical 
warefare, where political will is required for international 
control agreement. 
POLITICS 
176. GRAY (Colin S). Arms control does not control arms. 
Orbis. 37, 3; 1993; 333-48. 
There are many ways in which arms can be controlled. 
The approach known as arms control, which focuses upon the 
negotiation of measures of limited cooperation among 
potential foes, is among the least productive. Instead, the 
control of arms is achievable by policies designed both to 
balance the power of possible rogue states and to diminish 
the political incentives for conflict. The true relationship 
between arms and politics revealed by the conclusion of the 
cold war should stimulate a wholesale reappraisal of how 
arms can be best be controlled. 
177. MILLER (Steven E). Politics over promise : domestic 
impediments to arms control. International security. 8, 
4; 1984; 67-90. 
The disappointing result of arms control in the US 
seem to be a consequence of an imposing set of political 
impedements : policy formulation, the ratification process 
electrol politics, congressional politics bureaucratic 
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politics,, public opinion, even international politics have 
to be aligned properly or managed effectively if arms 
control is to be pursued successfully. Arms control progress 
requires that all internal political factors be brought in 
to positive alignment. 
, , , EUROPE 
new 178. DAALDER (Ivo H). Role of arms control in the 
Europe. Arms Control. 12, 1; 1991, May; 20-33. 
Arms control in Europe must have a new, more 
expansive role. This is not to say that the pursuit of arms 
control is sufficient to ensure European security. Threat to 
security are many, only some of which can be mitigated 
through arms control. The road from cold war to a 
pluralistic security community is a long one and the likeli-
hood that Europe as a whole will reach that destination is 
small. Arms control negotiations may lay the basis for 
transformation of political relations av/ay from potential 
confrontation towards mutually beneficial co-operation. 
, USA 
179. MURRY (Mathew). Procedural alternative for arms 
control. Arms Control. 6, 3; 1985, Dec; 213-42. 
The success of step by step arms control in the US 
congress will depend upon the capacity of the executive 
branch, and the willingness of the senate, to get agreements 
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passed with minimal political fanfare, so that they can move 
quickly on to the next step. The Joint resolution procedure 
will complement this strategy by providing the opportunity 
to obtain congressional consent without the unnecessary 
scrutiny, delay, and political bargaining characteristic of 
the treaty making procedure. By reducing the uncertainty 
over whether agreement will be passed, it will help the 
executive conceptlize and carry out a step by step approach 
to arms control. 
, UNITED NATIONS 
180. GOLDBLAT (Jozef). Role of United Nations in arms 
control : an assessment. Arms Control. 7, 2; 1986, Sep; 
115-32. 
Although the UN Charter makes few references to 
disarmament, the UN has provided a central forum for arms 
control efforts. However, in addition to promoting and 
setting goals for negotiations, the UN should codify the 
principles of the law of arras control accepted inter-
nationally and in, particular, elaborate new ones. While the 
use of weapons is already subject to limitation under the 
humanitarian law of ular, there is a growing body of opinion 
that the right of nations to possess arms should also be 
limited by law. 
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, SEA, ASIA-NORTHEAST 
181. MACK (Andrev?). Naval arms control and confidence 
building for North-East Asian waters. Korean Jl. of 
Defence Analysis. 5, 2; 1993; 135-64. 
Since the security environment of Asia-Pacific is 
primarily a maritime one, maritime security issues are 
highly salient. This paper focuses on the prospects for 
maritime security cooperation, confidence building, and 
naval arms control in North-East Asia. It examines the 
particular barriers to progress in China, Taiwan, the two 
Koreans, Japan and the US and Russia. It also describes the 
tentative attempts to institute dialogue on a bilateral 
basis and suggests some option for accelerating this process 
in future. 
, INDIAN OCEAN role of USA 
182. STIVERS (William). Doves, hawks, and detente. Foreign 
Policy. 45, 1981-82; 126-44. 
In assessing the Indian Ocean arms control episode it 
is apparent that those who advocated naval limitations had 
the better analysis. But the hard-liners had a clearer 
vision of hov/ the world should look and v;hat means the US 
had to employ to guarantee that vision. The doves were more 
sophisticated, the understood history. However, the 
liberals, unlike the conservatives could never formulate a 
conception of what constituted acceptable soviet behaviour. 
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USSR-USA 
183. HAASS (Richard N). Arms control at sea : the United 
states and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, 
1977-78. Journal of Strategic Studies. 10, 2; 1987, 
Jun; 231-47. 
Between June 1977 and February 1978, representatives 
of the US and the USSR met four times in an attempt to 
negtiate an arms control regime for the Indian ocean. Soviet 
assistance to its client Ethopia in the latter's conflict 
with its neighbour Somalia constituted the proximate cause 
for US termination of the diplomatic enterprise. Yet 
although substantial progress had been realized towards 
negotiating a pact that would limit US and Soviet naval 
deployments in the Indian ocean, it is not at all certain 
that further negotiation could have bridged the remaining 
differences. The mostly unsuccessful efforts highlight the 
technical and political obstacles to concluding arms control 
pact as well as the limited potential of formal arms control 
to contribute to a moderation of superpower geopolitical 
competition. 
, , SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, USA-USSR 
184. FEIVESON (Harold A) and DUFFIELD (John). Stopping the 
Seabased Counterforce threat. International Security. 
9, 1; 1984; 187-202. 
Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) 
fired close to US shores and using trajectories that 
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minimize the time of flight have appeared well suited to 
attacks on US strategic bomber bases and on many critical 
component of the command, control and communication network. 
A freeze on the deployment and flight-testing of new SLBMs 
and sharp limitations on the flight-testing of existing 
SLBris would have a significant impact on the level on the 
SLBris counterforce capability that could be developed. 
, USA 
185. TRITTEN (James J). New look at Naval arms control. 
Security Dialogue. 23, 3; 1993, Sept; 337-48. 
An examination of existing legal restraints on naval 
forces and arms control agreements lead to the conclusion 
that the US is already heavily engaged in naval arms 
control. With today's new international security 
environment, the author recommends a series of additional 
naval arms control measures. 
, USSR-USA 
186. BYERS (RB). Seapower and arms control : problems and 
prospects. International Journal. 36, 3; 1981; 485-514. 
An analysis of the contemporary East-West Naval 
balance, with emphasis on the US and USSR, is placed with in 
the context of the basis of seapower. Three aspect of 
seapower - the economic, the diplomatic political and 
military strategic are discussed in terms of major naval 
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missions in the three situations : peace time, a 
conventional war environment and a nuclear war environment. 
, SECURITY, EUROPE 
187. BETTS (Richard K). Systems for peace or causes of war? 
Collective security, arms control, and the new Europe. 
International security. 17, 1; 1992; 5-43. 
Recent proposals for collective security confuse 
causes and effects of peace, and could widen conflicts in 
Eastern Europe as easily as they might suppress them. Arms 
control treaties also make less sense in Europe after the 
cold war because stability depends on dyadic military 
balances, but alignments for a future conflict are not 
known. 
, 1980's 
188. WILLIAMS (Phil). Arms control and European security : 
competing conceptions for the 1980s. Arms Control. 4, 
2; 1983, Sep; 75-96. 
As a result of the experience of arms control in the 
1970s, the optimism and apparent certainty which pervaded 
much thinking on the subject has given way to a new period 
of pessimism and doubt. VJhat often appear to be arguments 
over arms control are really argument over the nature of the 
real threats to European security. Different prospective 
yield different criteria whereby arms control initiatives, 
negotiations and agreements can be appraised. 
158 
, MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION, USA-USSR 
189. BLACKER (Coit D). Negotiating Security : MBFR 
experience. Arms Control. 7, 3; 1986, Dec; 215-40. 
Since 197 3, efforts have been made by NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact to device a mutually acceptable formula to 
reduce on a reciprocal basis military personnel and their 
associated weaponary in central Europe. These efforts, knovm 
in the west as mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) 
have laid and important foundation for the reduction of 
military forces in central Europe. If an arm reduction 
agreement is concluded as the result of the talks betv/een 
Reagan and Gorbachev it can be regarded as a logical outcome 
of these long standing mutual force reduction negotiations. 
, STRUCTURAL INABILITY TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK, 
EUROPE 
190. LUTZ (Dieter S). SIA [Structural inability to launch an 
Attack] and Defensive Zones. Bulletin of Peace 
Proposals. 20, 1; 1989, Mar; 71-80. 
The concept of SIA is gaining increasing importance 
in discussions of security policy. In practice, SIA exists 
when military forces serve an efficient defence and 
deterrence function, but in virtue of their organization, 
structure armament and strategy are clearly in capable of 
engaging in aggressive operations. The creation of a 
chemical weapons-free zone and tank-free zones. Ultimately, 
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this defensive zone system would be expanded to include all 
of Europe in a step by step fashion conceived to move 
progressively closer to the final elimination of offensive 
potential. 
, SPACE, ANTI SATELLITE WEAPONS 
191. DAHLITZ (Julie). ASAT and related weapons : proposals 
for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Arms 
Control. 4, 3; 1983, 171, 86. 
There is a recognized need to outlaw anti-satellite 
(ASAT) weapons. An arms race in outer space is not possible 
to win in any worthy sense of the term and at the present 
time there are solutions which could prevent it. The best 
way to approach the problem would be to put constraints on 
permitted satellite formations, so as to preclude additional 
accuracy and redundancy. The general problem is that many of 
the available solutions are unpalatable. 
, USSR-USA 
192. ANDELMAN (David A). Space wars. Foreign Policy. 44; 
1981; 94-106. 
The next generation of American and Soviet weaponry 
is already taking shape in laboratories in both countries -
weaponry that v/ill substantially alter the way v/ar is 
fought. Generically these weapons are called directed energy 
weapons. Specifically, they are lasers and particle beams. 
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With present scientific and technical knowledge, space based 
lasers are the most feasible for development into a complete 
anti-satellite (ASAT) system. In a more elaborate confiyu-
ration they could serve as an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 
system as well. The most critical strategic problems posed 
by such systems are vulnerability to counter-measures, 
survivability and above all, reliability of command and 
control communications. 
193. MEYER (Stephen M). Anti-satellite weapons and arms 
control : incentives and disincentives from the Soviet 
and American perspectives. International Journal. 36, 
3; 1981; 460-84. 
Examines the military incentives and disincentives 
for developing anti-satellite weapons from both Soviet and 
American perspectives. First a comparative analysis compares 
and contrasts Soviet and American military strategies in 
terms of the prospectives roles and missions that might be 
assigned to anti-satellite weapons. Second, differences in 
the vulnerability of each nation's overall military 
capability to anti-satellite operations are examined. Third, 
option for minimizing the effects of anti-satellite weapons 
on military forces are described. 
161 
, USA-USSR 
194. DAHLITZ (Julie). Arms control in outer space. World 
Today. 38, 4; 1982, Apr; 154-60. 
Describes the edge of military competition between 
the US and the USSR involves the use of outer space for 
warlike purposes. A treaty should be formulated and signed 
by all powers debarring all satellite weapons and hence 
safeguard the command, control and communications networks 
of the super powers, thereby supporting the survivability of 
deterrent systems. The treaty should also enchance the 
safety of verification and observation satellites and 
forest all the development of space based ballistic missile 
defenses. 
, , USSR 
19 5. PILAT (Joseph). Star peace : Soviet space arms control 
strategy and objective. Washington quarterly. 10, 1; 
1987; 137-52. 
Irrespective of their hopes or expectations to 
reaching an agreement the Soviets will attempt to exploit 
negotiations on controlling space weaponry for propaganda 
purposes. Although there are widely divergent viev/s on the 
arms control objective on the USSR, an analysis of past 
negotiating behaviour suggests that the Soviet viev; arms 
control as a means of preserving or obtaining relative 
military avantages, or creating a climate (e.g. detente) 
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that facilitates achievement of military, political and 
economical objectives. 
, SUPER POWERS, MBFR, EUROPE 
196. SHEEHAN (Michael). A more inane congress : twelve years 
of MBFR. Arms Control. 6, 2; 1985, Sep; 150-9. 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) have 
achieved little if anything in the past tv/elve years. Given 
that the taks do not address. NATO's real problems to any 
significant degree, nor those of the USSR, that there may be 
costs as well as benefits associated with the continuation 
of the dialogue and that the beneficial aspects of MBFR are 
being promoted in confidence and security Building measure 
and diarmament in Europe, MBFR seems increasingly to be a 
pointless exercise. 
, , SOLUTIONS 
197. INTRILIGATOR (Michael n) and BRITO (Dagobert). Non-
Armageddon solutions to the arms race. Arms Control. 6, 
1; 1985, May; 41-57. 
There can be non-Armageddon solutions to the arms 
race. The US and the USSR have, via the arms race and arms 
control initiatives, developed a system that has great 
stability. Consideration of its imperfections suggests a 
restructured arms control agenda focusing on accidents, 
particularly launch on warming; the potential erosion of 
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deterrence via antisubmarine warfare and space-based defense 
and the potential for nuclear weapons to fall in the wrong 
hands. 
, , WEAPONS TRADE 
198. KEARNS (Graham). CAT and dogma : the future of multi-
lateral arms transfer restraint. Arms Control. 2, 1; 
1981, May; 3-24. 
If arms transfer restraint encourages undesirable 
consequences, then it will have to be coupled with other 
forms of restraint is not presently into the offering. The 
conventional Arms Talks have not resumed for two years, and 
in the present climate of superpower relations, that 
situation is unlikely to change. The prospect of other 
factors in the arms trade taking initiatives instead appears 
as remote as ever. 
, TRADE, CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, USA 
199. NEUMAN (Stephanie G). Controlling the arms trade : 
idealistic dream or realpolitik? Washington Quarterly. 
16, 3, 1993; 53-75. 
A constellation of events, particularly the inter-
national primacy of US, suggest that the global environment 
is ripe for conventional arms control initiatives. It will 
be American interests, influence and restore that will 
determine the character and effectiveness of international 
arms control measures, not the contents of general multi-
lateral agreements. The best to be hoped for one regional or 
global agreement to limit the export of specific types 
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weapons on a case by case basis and general accord to 
control the flow of arms to belligerents. If expectation 
remain modest there is cause for guarded optimism. The 
balance appears to be shifting in favour of further 
regulation of the conventional arms trade., 
, TREATIES, RATIFICATION, USA 
200. JOHNSON (Paul G). Arms Control and managing Linkage. 
Survival. 28, 5; 1986, Sep; 413-44. 
The American application of linkage has been 
inconsistent from administration to administration and the 
failure of US president to manage linkage properly has 
undermined. The ratification of arm control treaties, 
American leader must develop a long term strategy for using 
linkage, taking into account of different types of linkage 
and supported by a broad, bipartisan base consistent with 
essessment of American national interest. The linkage 
strategy can be an effective instrument in the arm control 
process. 
, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
201. GELLNER (Charles RX^ tld RUSTEN (Lynn F). United states 
arms control and disarmament agency, data on 
management, personnel, budget, status and related 
matters. 1981-83, Arms Control. 5, 2; 1984, Sep; 
128-47. 
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This article examines the resources available to 
ACDA to carry out its legislatively mandated functions 
during the first three years of the Reagan Administration. 
In 1981 and 1982, the Reagan administration reduced ACDA's 
budget and personnel levels, delayed in making top 
management appointments, and gave less emphasis to ACDA's 
role in national security policy making than did the carter 
administration. Beginning in 1983, the administration took 
measures to strengthen ACDA. Charts illustrating management 
turnovers, staffing levels and budget trends are included. 
, USA CONGRESS 
202. FASCELL (Dante B). Congress and arms control. Foreign 
Affairs. 65, 4; 1987; 730-49. 
Each of the arms control amendments of 1986 will be 
persued again during the 100 the congress. Despite the 
obvious need to work toward a consensus with congress on the 
nation's arms control policy, the administration once again 
has thrown down the guntlet. There is considerable concern 
in congress that some of the administration's proposals for 
complete nuclear disarmament and premature deployment of SDI 
would damage US national security and undercut the leverage 
.^merican negotiators will need in future talks with the 
Soviets. 
, USA-USSR 
203. DIXON (William J) and SMITH (Dale L). Arms control and 
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the evolution of superpower relations. Social Science 
Quarterly. 73, 4; 1992, Dec; 876-89. 
This study investigates v/hether or not the enactment 
of bilateral arms control agreements systematically 
influenced the foreign policies and behaviour of the US and 
USSR tov/ard one another. All formal arms control agreements 
and treaties between the superpowers are treated as 
inventions in an interrupted time series quasi experiment 
applied to event based measures of diplomatic relations. The 
impact clearly contributed to an improvements in diplomatic 
realtions rather than the reverse, and these improvements 
were sufficiently robust to rise above the powerful effects 
of action-reaction dynamics. 
204. EBERSTADT (Hary Tedeschi). Arms control and its causal-
ties. Commentary. 85, 4; 1988, Apr; 39-46. 
In the course of its overtures to the USSR, the US 
administration has sacrificed most of the momentum and many 
of the principles and initiatives that marked its early 
years. However, it is the costs to the US abroad that remain 
the most critical consequences. In addition, the 
administration's persuit of arms control has had a negative 
effect on the US policy on terrorism. The loss of the Reagan 
arms control agenda appeared to vindicate the intellectual 
and bureaucratic power of the foreign affairs establishment 
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and to elevate to the level of statesman the 
administration's most persistent critics. 
, 1970's 
205. BRADY (Linda P) . Arms control and the Carter adminis-
tration : the management of contradictions. South 
eastern Political Review. 16, 1; 1988; 175-203. 
Much of the blame for the failure of arms control 
duriny the late 1970s must be ascribed to the Carter 
administration's inability to manage, the contradictions 
inherent in US-Soviet relations, the US european 
relationship, and defense planning and arms control. The 
Carter administration learned too late a successful arms 
control policy requires the expenditure of large amounts of 
political capital. There were, however, factors beyond the 
control of the Carter administration, such as Soviet 
adventurism in Africa and involvement of the USSR in the 
civil war in Afghanistan. 
, USSR in relation to MARXISM-LENINISM, IMPLICATIONS 
206. BAKER (RH). Another perspective on Marxism-Leninism and 
arms control. Arms Control. 1,2; 1980, Sept; 157-76. 
Soviet leaders do not concern themselves extensively 
with the difficulties posed for dialectical materialism by 
the philosophical implications of the special and general 
theories of relativity. Leninism is a factful doctrine with 
168 
an articulated but as yet unmanifested commitment to the 
achievement of an unknowable set of social and economic 
arrangements. The nature of the USSR's international being 
has to be understood through the record of its experience in 
international affairs. 
, CONTROL, VERIFICATION^INSPECTION, SITE 
207. KILGOUR (D Marc). Site selection for on-site inspection 
in arms control. Arms Control. 13, 3; 1992, Dec; 439-62, 
Arms control agreements rely increasingly or 
strictly limited amounts of on site inspection to achieve 
their objectives. Random choice of sites to be inspected 
clearly serves the purposes, although the precise connection 
between strategic goals and site selection pattern is 
problematic in the absence of collateral information. Formal 
models are analysed using games theoretic techniques to 
identify strategically optimal site elections. Usually sites 
with greater military values should be inspected more often, 
but less than proportionate of their values. 
, VERIFICATION, INTELLIGENCE, CIA, USA 
208. EPSTEIN (Edward Jay). Disinformation : or, why the CIA 
cannot verify an arms control agreement. Commentary. 
74, 1; 1982, Jul; 21-8. 
Congress and informed US public have been under the 
impression that satellites and electronic wizardly can be 
169 
relied upon for fool proof intelliyence. The story of the 
misestimates of Soviet missiles accuracy demonstrate that 
these means are quite susceptible to Soviet deception. The 
persistent denial of the problem of disinformation serves 
only to increase itsk chances of success. And without a 
radical reorganization opposed by CIA bureaucracy, few 
measures can be taken to prevent it from being double 
crossed again. 
209. CODEVILLA (Anglo). Arms and intelligence. Global 
affairs. 2, 1; 1987; 34-46. 
The essence of the US approach to arras control 
intelligence is the willingness to look at some thing one 
cansee and take it as a substitute for many things one 
cannot see. It is legitimate to say that some of the most 
important strategic questions the US must face are 
relatively intractable to technical intelligence. Not the 
least of the lessons the US can learn as it disentangles its 
technical intelligence from the intellectual categories of 
arms control is to dissolve the smugness about its knowledge 
of the USSR that comes along with intelligence satellites. 
This smugness led the US to try to make up v/ith 
"verification" what it lacked in political and military 
policy. 
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, MONITORING 
210. OELRICH (Ivan). Production monitoring for arms control. 
Arms Control. 9, 1; 1988, May; 3-18. 
During the negotiation for the limitation of inter-
mediate range missiles, the US introduced the idea that 
production facilities for the missiles be monitored to 
enhance verification. Production monitoring breaks new 
ground in arms control verification. By counting v/eapons as 
they are produced each side can maintain an accounting of 
the inventory of weapons that the other side has v/ith 
production monitoring new verification possibilities open up 
for weapons that are difficult to account for once deployed. 
However, production monitoring will not solve all the 
problems of arms control verification. 
, INSPECTION 
211. BLAKER (James R) . On-site inspection : the military 
significance of an arms - control proposal. Survival. 
26, 3; 1984, Jun; 98-106. 
On-site inspections are no substitute for the 
military adjustments, preparations and resource necessary to 
defend NATO in the event of a conflict. But serious 
evaluation of their potential complement to NATO's defensive 
capacity is overdue. It would be v/asteful to use inspections 
for purposes other than gathering information, and a 
171 
perversion of the concept of verification in arms control to 
do so. But this should not restrict the use of inspections 
for other purposes. 
, WEAPONS-PROLIFERATION, INDIA-PAKISTAN 
212. ROY-CHAUDHURY (Rahul). Regional stability and weapons 
proliferation in South Asia. Strategic Analysis. 15, 7; 
1992, Oct; 643-56. 
South Asia continues to suffer from ethic, 
territorial, and ideological tensions indigenous to the 
area. In order to deal with these threats, states procure 
sophisticated arms and increase their defense budgets. 
Regional stability necessitates a series of arms control 
measures among these states. Since it is difficult to 
control the spread of weapons in the post-proliferation 
stages; it is critical to manage this effectively. 
Traditional measures to limit horizontal proiferation are 
insufficient in this regard. Realistic assessments of 
regional politics military environment need to be made to 
evolve appropriate policies. Measures could primarily 
involve indo-Pakistan agreements on nuclear and ballistic 
weapons, along with certain assurances from China. States in 
the region also need to shed their reservations on regional 
arms control. 
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ABM : Anti-Ballistic Missile. 
GDI : Conventional Defence Initiatives 
CIA : Central Intelligence Agency. 
CND : Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 
CW : Chemical Warfare 
GATT : General Agreement on Trade and Tariff. 
IAEA : International Atomic Energy Association. 
ICBM : Intecontinental Ballistic Missile 
INF : Intermediate Nuclear Forces. 
IRBM : Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
LSN : Low Silence Nuclear 
MAD : Mutual Assured Destruction. 
MBFR : Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction. 
MTCR : Missile Technology Control Regime 
NATO : North Atto Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
NFW : Nuclear Free World. 
NNVJS : Non-Nuclear Weapons States. 
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NSA : National Security Agency. 
NWS : Nuclear Weapons States. 
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